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ABSTRACT
In 2007, eleven major U.S. research universities and the Association of American
Medical Colleges signed an accord titled “In the Public Interest: Nine Points to
Consider in Licensing University Technology.” The Nine Points document outlined a
range of issues that universities should consider when licensing their technology to the
private sector - from reservations of rights and limitations on exclusivity to refraining
from dealing with patent assertion entities to making medical technologies accessible
at affordable prices. More than talking points, the document proposed specific
contractual clauses intended to promote the educational and public welfare missions
of universities. Today, more than one hundred academic institutions and associations
around the world have signed the Nine Points document. Yet in the fourteen years since
it was created, there has been no systematic, empirical assessment of its effect on
university licensing practices. This article fills that gap with the first empirical study
of the effect of the Nine Points document on university licensing practices. Through a
review of 224 publicly available university patent licenses signed both before and after
the adoption of the Nine Points document, this article finds that the document prompted
few measurable changes in university licensing practices. Universities largely
continued to include in their licensing agreements the contractual clauses that they had
previously included, and did not, to any meaningful degree, add new clauses
recommended by the Nine Points document. To the extent they did, such new clauses
protected university interests rather than the public interest. The lackluster adoption
of the recommendations made by the Nine Points document suggests that, by and large,
universities have prioritized commercial interests over the public-oriented goals of the
document. As such, a reorientation of university technology transfer policy may be in
order – a shift that may be facilitated through greater engagement of academic faculty,
senior administrators, students, alumni and other institutional stakeholders in setting
policy for university technology transfer.
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INTRODUCTION
University technology licensing is a significant economic activity in the United
States. In 2020, 184 U.S. academic research institutions received more than 8,700
U.S. patents and applied for nearly 18,000 more.1 During the same year, these
institutions entered into more than ten thousand technology licensing and option
agreements with the private sector.2 University-based research played a major role
in the growth of the biotechnology industry and has made significant contributions
to industries such as computer software, medical devices and the Internet.3 The
licensing of university-owned patents has resulted in many notable products and
services, ranging from the Gatorade® sports drink (University of Florida) to
CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing (UC Berkeley and the Broad Institute of Harvard and
MIT) to the Google search algorithm (Stanford).
Yet the business of academic technology transfer has not always been viewed
favorably by the public. Beginning in the 1990s, fears emerged that the promise of
licensing revenue was causing universities to stray from their core educational and
public missions.4 Critics identified potential conflicts of interest between academic
institutions and corporate sponsors as early as 1974, when an agreement between
Monsanto and Harvard Medical School attracted significant public opprobrium.5
Consumer advocate Ralph Nader echoed the fears of many in 2004 when he wrote:
Academic science, with its custom of open exchange, its gift
relationships, its willingness to provide expert testimony that
1

Assn. Univ. Tech. Managers, AUTM 2020 Licensing Activity Survey at 5 (2021) [hereinafter
AUTM 2020 Survey]. For general discussions of university patenting patterns and practices, see,
e.g., Jennifer Carter-Johnson, University Technology Transfer Structure and Intellectual Property
Policies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 1,
6-8 (Jacob H. Rooksby ed., 2020); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Rebecca Weires, University
Patenting: Is Private Law Serving Public Values?, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1329 (2019); Peter Lee,
Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1 (2013).
2
AUTM 2020 Survey, supra note 1, at 5.
3
See, generally, NATL. RES. COUNCIL, RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA: TEN
BREAKTHROUGH ACTIONS VITAL TO OUR NATION’S PROSPERITY AND SECURITY 49 (2012); Yali
Friedman, Biotech’s U.S. Birth, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN – WORLDVIEW 54 (2009); Tammy D’Amato,
Lindsey Gilroy & Scott Oldach, From the Classroom to the Boardroom – How Universities Can
Become the Flywheel for Economic Growth, Intell. Prop. Today, Sept. 2009, at 22.
4
See, e.g., Peter Mikhail, Hopkins v. CellPro: An Illustration That Patenting and Exclusive
Licensing of Fundamental Science Is Not Always in the Public Interest, 13 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 375
(2000); Eliot Marshall, When Commerce and Academe Collide, 248 SCIENCE 152 (1990)
(identifying increasing ties between industry and academia during the 1980s).
5
See JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 4-5 (2005). See also DANIEL S. GREENBERG, SCIENCE FOR SALE: THE PERILS,
REWARDS, AND DELUSIONS OF CAMPUS CAPITALISM 2 (2007) (asking whether “today’s commercial
values [have] contaminated academic research, diverting it from socially beneficial goals to
mercenary service on behalf of profit-seeking corporate interests?”); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S
Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289
(2003); Rebecca S Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 Yale L.J. 177 (1987).
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speaks truth to power, its serendipitous curiosity and its
nonproprietary legacy to the next generation of studentscientists, differs significantly from corporate science,
which is ridden with trade secrets, profit-determined
selection of research, and awesome political power to get its
way, whether by domination or servility to its payers.6
Another public critic was journalist Jennifer Washburn, whose 2005 book
University Inc. – The Corporate Corruption of Higher Education, focused on the
increasing commercialization of university research. Washburn highlighted
transactions like UC Berkeley’s multimillion dollar deal with Novartis/Syngenta,
which led to student and faculty protests on campus, as well as an investigation and
hearings by the California State Senate.7
Against the backdrop of these critiques, representatives of thirteen major
research institutions met at Stanford University in 2006 to hash out a set of guiding
principles for their burgeoning technology licensing businesses.8 Together, these
institutions held patents covering some of the most important, and profitable,
biotechnology, chemical and electronic technologies in the world. Yet in March
2007, they produced a document that called for restraint in their commercial
licensing practices. It urged academic institutions everywhere to recall their
educational and public missions, and to refrain from pure profit-seeking when
licensing patents to the private sector.
The seventeen-page document, titled In the Public Interest: Nine Points to
Consider in Licensing University Technology (the “Nine Points document”)9, was
a milestone in the field of academic technology transfer. One senior university
official has referred to it as the “Pledge of Allegiance” for technology transfer,10
and it is still referenced regularly in scholarly articles, government reports and
industry bulletins relating to academic technology transfer.11

6

Ralph Nader, Foreword in SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST – HAS THE
LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? xiii, xiv (pbk. ed. 2004).
7
WASHBURN, supra note 5, at 3-24.
8
See Part II.A, infra.
9
In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology, Mar. 6, 2007,
https://news.stanford.edu/news/2007/march7/gifs/whitepaper.pdf (visited Sep. 12, 2021)
[hereinafter Nine Points document].
10
See TechTransferIP Podcast with Lisa Mueller, Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University
Technology with Kathy Ku (Sep. 8, 2021), https://music.amazon.com/podcasts/ea3e863b-db1847b7-9cc1-9f660d0ae276/episodes/57ea2bfa-c451-47a2-a937-4e4ae16c55bc/tech-transfer-ipnine-points-to-consider-in-licensing-university-technology-with-kathy-ku? (interview with Kathy
Ku, former head of Stanford’s Office of Technology Licensing).
11
See sources cited in notes x, infra.
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As of this writing, 118 research institutions and associations around the world
have signed the Nine Points document.12 To a significant degree, the document has
become the symbol of a more public-spirited approach to university technology
transfer. As observed by Professor David Winickoff, universities view the
document as “a testament to the public values underlying technology transfer.”13
The Nine Points document has been endorsed by bodies including the National
Research Council14 and the Association of American Universities.15 It has been
held up at Congressional hearings as evidence of the academic community’s
commitment to the public good.16 As Professor Winickoff characterizes it, the Nine
Points document is “an act of public accountability” that “broadcast[s] the
collective goals of the academic licensing community and its operating principles
to the public”.17
Yet more than just statements of principle, the Nine Points document proposes
specific contractual clauses that are intended to promote the educational and public
welfare missions of universities – clauses providing for the retention of internal
research rights, limitations on the automatic licensing of improvements, and
requirements that medical innovations be made broadly available at affordable
prices.18 As such, it is one of the first such policy statements to operationalize its
drafters’ conception of the public good with concrete textual recommendations.
The Nine Points document aspires to serve as a blueprint for future behavior by
its signatories and all academic institutions. In this regard, its creators may have
been inspired by other globally significant consensus documents such as the 1996
Bermuda Principles, an accord that continues to shape the practice of scientific data
sharing today.19
12

Assn. Univ. Tech. Managers, Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology,
https://autm.net/about-tech-transfer/principles-and-guidelines/nine-points-to-consider-whenlicensing-university (visited Sep. 12, 2021) [hereinafter Nine Points Signatories].
13
David E. Winickoff, Private Assets, Public Mission: The Politics of Technology Transfer and the
New American University, 54 JURIMETRICS 1, 30 (2013)).
14
NATL. RES. COUNCIL, MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST at 6, 66, 72 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2011) (recommending
adoption of principles stated in the Nine Points document) [hereinafter NRC University IP].
15
AAU Working Group on Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property, Statement to the AAU
Membership on University Technology Transfer and Managing Intellectual Property in the Public
Interest, Mar. 2015 [hereinafter AAU Statement].
16
The Bayh-Dole Act (P.L 96-517, Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act 1980) -- The
Next 25 Years: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on Tech. and Innovation, Comm. Sci. and Tech.,
110th Cong. At 20-36 (2007) (testimony of Dr. Arundeep Pradhan, chief technology transfer official
at Oregon Health and Science University); The Role of Federally Funded University Research in
the Patent System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony
of Charles Louis—Vice Chancellor for Research at University of California, Riverside) (both cited
in Winickoff, supra note 13, at 32.
17
Winickoff, supra note 13, at 30.
18
See Part x, infra.
19
The Bermuda Principles were created by a group of approximately fifty scientific and
governmental leaders of the Human Genome Project and revolutionized the sharing of scientific
data both among HGP participants and the public. See Kathryn Maxson Jones, Rachel A. Ankeny
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But did the Nine Points document live up to its promise? Public critiques of
university technology transfer practices have surged in recent years. As before,
commentators have questioned whether universities have abandoned their public
missions, focusing instead on earning profits from lucrative licensing deals.20 These
critiques have been especially acute in connection with recent biomedical
innovations such as COVID-19 vaccines21 and CRISPR gene editing
technologies.22
One particular question raised by this ongoing debate is whether the Nine Points
document had any measurable effect on university licensing practices. Did it temper
the commercial tendencies of university licensing offices, or was it, as Professor
Winickoff asks, merely an exercise in “optics”?23 While various universities over
the years have issued public statements espousing the values reflected in the Nine
Points document,24 no systematic, empirical assessment of its effect on university
licensing practices has ever been conducted.25 This article fills that gap.
& Robert Cook-Deegan, The Bermuda Triangle: The Pragmatics, Policies, and Principles for Data
Sharing in the History of the Human Genome Project, 51 J. HIST. BIOLOGY 693 (2018); Jorge L.
Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy: Patents, Policy and the Design of the Genome Commons, 12 MINN.
J. L. SCI. & TECH. 61 (2011).
20
See Brian L. Frye & Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., Technology Transfer and the Public Good, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 236, 236 (Jacob
H. Rooksby ed., 2020); Ouellette & Weires, supra note 1; Rebecca S Eisenberg & Robert CookDeegan, Universities: The Fallen Angels of Bayh-Dole?, 147 DAEDELUS 76 (2018); Sigrid Sterckx,
Patenting and licensing university research - promoting innovation or undermining academic
values? 17 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 45 (2009).
21
See, e.g., Matthew Rimmer, The People’s Vaccine: Intellectual Property, Access to Essential
Medicines, and the Coronavirus COVID-19, J. INTELL. PROP. STUD. (2021) (discussing calls by
student activists for universities to make their IP more available in the COVID-19 vaccine effort);
Jorge L. Contreras, The Open COVID Pledge: Design, Implementation and Preliminary Assessment
of an Intellectual Property Commons, 2021 UTAH L. REV. 833, __ (2021) (describing student-led
campaign to persuade universities to contribute vaccine-related intellectual property to the COVID19 response).
22
See, e.g., Knut J Egelie et al., The ethics of access to patented biotech research tools from
universities and other research institutions, 36 NATURE BIOTECH. 495 (2018) (“Exclusive licensing
to a surrogate company granted by a university will, as for CRISPR–Cas9, create concentrated
control of the use of the technology in a for-profit entity that has both short and long-term goals that
are likely to be in conflict with the broad dissemination of the technology”); Jorge L. Contreras &
Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Surrogate Licensing, and Scientific Discovery, 355 SCIENCE 698 (2017)
(discussing university exclusive licensing of CRISPR-Cas9 intellectual property).
23
Winickoff, supra note 13, at 40. See also Liza Vertinsky, Universities as Guardians of Their
Inventions, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1949, 2008 (2012) (“there is little evidence that informal measures
such as [the Nine Points document] have been adequate to curtail universities’ self-interested actions
in the face of increasing competition for scarce resources”).
24
See, e.g., James K. Woodell & Tobin L. Smith, Technology Transfer for All the Right Reasons,
18 TECH. & INNOVATION 295, 299-300 (2017) (describing numerous university commitments to the
public interest and statements following the Nine Points document).
25
One prior study of university socially responsible licensing practices relied primarily on
interviews with university TTO officials at eleven universities in North America and Europe. ThiYen Nguyen, Mohammad Shahzad & Juliana Veras, Recent Experiences in Policy Implementation
of Socially Responsible Licensing in Select Universities Across Europe and North America:
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In order to gain a better understanding of the impact of the Nine Points
document on university licensing practices, this study reviewed 224 publicly
available university licenses signed both before and after the adoption of the Nine
Points document. This article describes our findings, both as to the nature of
universities that have signed the Nine Points document, as well as its effect on
university licensing provisions.
In short, this study found that university licensing practices changed very little
in response to the Nine Points document. By and large, after the Nine Points
document was signed, universities continued to adhere to their existing contractual
language, with some minor alterations, most of which appear to protect the
university’s interests rather than promote the public good. But while adoption of
the contractual provisions suggested by the Nine Points document has been
lackluster, the Nine Points document has served as a launching pad for other, more
ambitious, university licensing programs, and may thus exert its greatest influence
as a model of norms for public interest initiatives in the university setting.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part I provides additional
background regarding university patenting in the United States, the Bayh-Dole Act
of 1980, and notable public disputes that contributed to the adoption of the Nine
Points document. Part II describes, in greater detail, the process by which the Nine
Points document was created and adopted, summarizes each of the provisions of
the Nine Points document, and describes additional programs and mechanisms that
were adopted in its wake. Part III describes the methodology and results of the
empirical study of university licenses signed both before and after the publication
of the Nine Points document. Part IV presents a discussion and analysis of these
results. The article concludes with areas for further study.
I. UNIVERSITY PATENTING AND LICENSING IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

Bayh-Dole and University Patenting

Before World War II, research at many U.S. universities had little practical
application.26 But with the need to combat the technological advances being
deployed to great effect by Germany, the U.S. mobilized its substantial research
establishment for the war effort. Vannevar Bush, the Dean of MIT’s School of
Engineering and the founder of Raytheon, led the government’s new Office of
Identifying Key Provisions to Promote Global Access To Health Technologies, LES NOUVELLES 189
(Sept. 2018).
26
For informative discussions of pre-WW2 R&D by U.S. academic researchers, see Bhaven N.
Sampat, Whose Drugs Are These?, 36 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 42 (2020); Jennifer Carter-Johnson,
University Technology Transfer Structure and Intellectual Property Policies, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 1, 6-8 (Jacob H. Rooksby
ed., 2020).
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Scientific Research and Development, drawing on his longstanding ties to
academia as he oversaw key wartime initiatives such as the development of radar
and nuclear weapons.27 During America’s post-War economic boom, Bush
continued to guide national research policy and the Federal government poured
money into academic labs. Between 1953 and 1980, federal non-defense R&D
funding increased from $2.2 billion to $41.5 billion – much of which was paid to
America’s research institutions.28
Though this bonanza of federal spending produced impressive research results,
including multiple Nobel prizes for American scientists, relatively little academic
research found its way into the commercial sector. Unlike Japan, where the
government directly funded industrial research programs in fields like
semiconductors and consumer electronics, there was no straightforward pathway
from U.S. academic laboratories to the marketplace.29 The problem, many felt,
resulted from the murky rules governing the handling of patents for federallyfunded research. Some federal funding agencies claimed ownership over inventions
that they funded, others ceded rights to their grantees, and others didn’t specify one
way or the other.30 The result of this lack of clarity was that few federally-funded
inventions were being patented or used by the private sector.31
The proposed solution to this problem came in the form of legislation sponsored
by Senators Birch Bayh (D-IN) and Bob Dole (R-KS). The legislation that they
introduced – the Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act of 1980, more
commonly known as the Bayh-Dole Act32 -- made a number of adjustments to the
patent system focused on federally-funded academic research.
First, the Bayh-Dole Act provides that when an academic institution develops
a patentable technology using federal research funding, the institution is entitled to
patent the invention. Moreover, if the institution fails to seek a patent, it may lose
rights to the invention. In effect, universities are penalized for not patenting their
inventions. Another section of the Bayh-Dole Act provides that any institution
earning revenue from one of these patents must share some of its profits with the
individual inventors. The statute does not specify how much each inventor should
get, but most universities have developed a rough three-way split of royalty

27

See Sampat, supra note 26.
AAAS, Historical Trends in Federal R&D, By Function: Defense and Nondefense R&D, 19532017, https://www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/historical-trends-federal-rd.
29
Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, Technology Transfer, and Patent Policy: The University
Contribution, 82 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1729-30 (1996).
30
See NRC University IP, supra note 14, at 16; Rebecca S Eisenberg, Public Research and Private
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1663, 1676-77 (1996); GREENBERG, supra note 5, at 52-53.
31
See NRC University IP, supra note 14, at 16 (“very little federally funded research was
commercialized prior to 1980”).
32
Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, Pub. L. 96-517 (Dec.12, 1980), codified at 94 Stat.
3015, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
28
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licensing income among the inventors, their academic departments, and the
university itself, after deducting overhead for the TTO itself.33
Critics point to the Bayh-Dole Act as a major factor in the commercialization
of academic science,34 while supporters credit it with saving the American
technology economy.35 In 2002, The Economist labeled the Act “the goose that
laid the golden egg” – attributing much of America’s technological relevance to
this single piece of legislation.36 But whichever side of this debate one favors,
almost everyone would agree that the Bayh-Dole Act has substantially changed the
world of university technology transfer.
B.

TTOs and University Licensing

Following the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, many universities established
technology transfer offices (TTOs)37 that were charged with overseeing the
growing patent portfolios in university hands. While most universities operate their
TTOs as internal units, sometimes falling under the jurisdiction of the university
counsel or the office of the provost, others have established semi-autonomous
entities (often structured as foundations) to hold intellectual property emerging
from university labs.38 Universities staff their TTOs with attorneys and business
managers with expertise in patents, technology licensing and commercialization.39
In many cases, the most likely industrial licensee of a university invention is an
established enterprise actively pursuing the development of products in the relevant
field. Sometimes, however, established industrial partners may not exist,
particularly when technologies are in new and emerging fields. In these cases,
university researchers, working with external advisors and funders, may form startup companies to commercialize the discoveries generated by their labs. According
33

See Carter-Johnson, supra note 26, at 26-27; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Andrew Tutt, How do
patent incentives affect university researchers?, 61 INTL. REV. L. & ECON. 105883 at 9-10 (2020).
34
See, e.g., Eisenberg & Cook-Deegan, supra note 20; Ouellette & Weires, supra note 1; Lorelei
Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost, 43 HOUS. L. REV.
1373 (2007); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 5.
35
See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab: Why Universities Should Take a
Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. REV. 407 (2007), F. Scott Kieff,
Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A
Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001); David C. Mowery et al., The Growth
of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act
of 1980, 30 RES. POL’Y 99 (2001).
36
Opinion, Innovation's golden goose, ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2002.
37
Such groups are variously known as technology transfer offices (TTOs), technology licensing
offices (TLOs), technology venture and commercialization (TVC) offices, and even, in the case of
the University of Utah, the Partners for Innovation, Ventures, Outreach & Technology (PIVOT)
Center. See https://pivotcenter.utah.edu. For ease of discussion, in this article refers to all such
groups as TTOs.
38
See David Orozco, Assessing the Efficacy of the Bayh-Dole Act Through the Lens of University
Technology Transfer Offices (TTOS), 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 115, 121 (2019).
39
See Carter-Johnson, supra note 26, at 15. The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF),
discussed in Part x, infra, is one such foundation. See Orozco, supra note 38, at 135-37.
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to survey data collected by the Association of University Technology Managers
(AUTM), in 2020 over one thousand start-up companies were formed to exploit
university-owned intellectual property.40 These companies are sometimes referred
to as university “spinouts”, and AUTM data shows that in 2020 approximately 16%
of university technology licenses were granted to such spinout companies.41
C.

Public Concerns Over University Patents and Licensing

As discussed in the Introduction, public objections to the ties between academia
and the private sector began to emerge in the 1990s.42 University administrators
were keenly aware of these criticisms.43 In addition to these generalized complaints,
several specific incidents motivated leading research institutions to reconsider their
technology transfer policies in the mid-2000s, culminating in the adoption of the
Nine Points document in 2007.

1. The Research Tool Controversy
Some university inventions have proven to be of significant general
applicability – “research tools” that can aid other researchers in a wide range of
investigations. By the early 1990s, significant concerns had emerged regarding
patents on key biomedical research tools including the polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) and short DNA fragments known as expressed sequence tags (ESTs).44
Various high-level committees were formed to consider the issues raised by
patented research tools,45 and in 1998 Rebecca Eisenberg and Mark Heller
cautioned that excessive patenting of biomedical research tools could lead to a
counterproductive “anticommons”.46 In 1999, the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) published a set of non-binding guidelines encouraging its grant recipients to

40

See AUTM 2020 Survey, supra note 1, at x.
See AUTM 2020 Survey, supra note 1, supplemental data (of 10,050 license and option
agreements, 1,601 were granted to start-up companies). In some cases, universities have granted
sweeping, exclusive rights to these start-up companies, covering an entire portfolio of patents and
all known applications of the resulting technologies. Jacob Sherkow and I have criticized this
practice (which we refer to as “surrogate licensing”) as it allows a university to avoid its public
mission by outsourcing the exploitation of its patent rights to a for-profit company that does not
necessarily share that mission. Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 22.
42
See notes x-y, supra, and accompanying text.
43
See Ben Butkus, Tech Transfer White Paper Authors Hope to Spur Debate, Socially Responsible
Licensing,
BIOTECHTRANSFERWEEK,
Mar.
19,
2007,
https://www.genomeweb.com/biotechtransferweek/tech-transfer-white-paper-authors-hopespurdebate-socially-responsible-licensin#.YVUMwC1h2Zw (noting awareness of criticisms by Jennifer
Washburn, among others, as prompting action by organizers of the Nine Points document).
44
See NATL. RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESEARCH TOOLS IN
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 43-46, 51-55 (1996) [hereinafter NRC Research Tools Report].
45
See NRC Research Tools Report, supra note 44, at vii-viii.
46
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
41
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license patented research tools on a non-exclusive basis to promote their greatest
utilization.47
Notwithstanding these cautionary notes, universities continued to obtain patents
covering research tools. In most cases, these patents were not perceived as
significant barriers to scientific research.48 Yet some holders of research tool
patents began to explore different ways to monetize these patents, including by
charging “reach-through” royalties based not on the use of the research tool itself,
but upon revenue earned through products developed using the tool.49 Though
considered “inappropriate” under the NIH Guidelines,50 the attempt to collect
reach-through royalties became increasingly frequent and controversial,
particularly in the biotechnology industry.51
2. The WARF Stem Cell Controversy
Closely related to the research tool controversy was a situation involving the
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF), the technology
commercialization arm of the University of Wisconsin - Madison (UW).52 WARF,
established in 1925, granted its first commercial license to the Quaker Oats
Company for a Vitamin D supplement intended to combat the childhood disease
rickets.53 Today, WARF reports that it enters into approximately one hundred
commercial licensing agreements per year and has contributed nearly $3.4 billion
to UW.54 In addition to Vitamin D enrichment, WARF has licensed blockbuster

47

Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and
Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 60 FED. REG. 72090 (Dec. 23, 1999)
(hereinafter NIH Research Tool Guidelines).
48
John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing
on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 289 (Wesley M.
Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (“we find little evidence of routine breakdowns in
negotiations over rights, although research tool patents are observed to impose a range of social
costs and there is some restriction of access”).
49
See Alfred C. Server, Nader Mousavi & Jane M. Love, Reach-Through Rights and the
Patentability, Enforcement, and Licensing of Patents on Drug Discovery Tools, 1 HASTINGS SCI.
TECH. L.J. 21, 62-63 (2009).
50
NIH Research Tool Guidelines, supra note 47, at 72,091 (“Royalties on the sale of a final product
that does not embody the tool, or other reach-through rights directed to a final product that does not
embody the tool discourage use of tools and are not appropriate in these circumstances”).
51
See Server et al., supra note 49, at 64 (“reach-through royalties have generated significant
controversy”); Kimberlee A. Stafford, Reach-Through Royalties in Biomedical Research Tool
Patent Licensing: Implications of NIH Guidelines on Small Biotechnology Firms, 9 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 699, 705 (2005) (noting increasing use of reach-through royalties by universities).
52
Wisconsin
Alumni
Research
Foundation,
‘Our
History’,
http://www.warf.org/about/index.jsp?cid=26
53
Id.
54
WARF, Strengthening UW-Madison with a Century of Support, https://www.warf.org/aboutwarf/impact-on-uw-madison/ (accessed Sep. 11, 2021).
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products including the blood thinner warfarin,55 making it one of the most
successful university technology commercialization operations in the country.56
In 1998, UW researcher James Thompson and colleagues succeeded in creating
the first long-lasting human embryonic stem cell (hESC) line. The hESC cells, and
methods for producing them, were covered by a series of patents held by WARF
and its wholly-owned subsidiary WiCell.57 WARF’s licensing program for its
hESC cell line was controversial. Beginning in 2001, WARF charged academic
researchers $5,000 to obtain hESC cells.58 But pricing alone did not generate
opposition to WARF’s licensing program. Equally important were the restrictions
that WARF placed on researchers’ ability to share cell lines with collaborators59
and to use them in research sponsored by the private sector.60 Others were
uncomfortable with the restrictions that WARF placed on particular uses of its
hESC cells, such as embryo implantation and the creation of human embryos and
human-nonhuman chimeras.61
Though WARF entered into more than 130 hESC licenses by 2005,62 opposition
to its licensing program steadily grew. Harvard molecular biologist Douglas Melton
publicly called WARF’s licensing terms “onerous, restrictive and uncooperative”.63
55

See Kevin Walters, Of Rats and Men: Warfarin Becomes World Famous by 1955, WARF Decade
by Decade (2015), https://www.warf.org/announcement/of-rats-and-men-warfarin-becomes-worldfamous-by-1955/ (noting that the name “warfarin” is a portmanteau of “WARF” and the chemical
compound “coumarin”).
56
Carl Gulbrandsen, WARF’s licensing policy for ES cell lines, 25 NATURE BIOTECH. 387, 387
(2007).
57
For ease of reference, I refer simply to WARF as the holder and licensor of these patents. A good
discussion of WARF’s hESC patents and associated licensing practices can be found in Sean
O'Connor, The Use of MTAs to Control Commercialization of Stem Cell Diagnostics and
Therapeutics, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017 (2006), John M. Golden, WARF’s Stem Cell Patents
and Tensions between Public and Private Sector Approaches to Research, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
314 (2010) and Winickoff, supra note 13, at 21-23.
58
Other than this access fee, WARF did not charge academic researchers to operate under its hESC
patents. Commercial researchers, on the other hand, were required to pay significant licensing fees.
See Golden, supra note 57, at 319-20. This being said, some researchers complained about the
$5,000 charge, as other suppliers of hESC cells, including Harvard University, charged nothing for
them. See Jeanne F. Loring & Cathryn Campbell, Intellectual Property and Human Embryonic Stem
Cell Research, 311 SCIENCE 1716, 1717 (2006).
59
According to Carl Gulbrandsen, WARF’s former Managing Director, restrictions on the
distribution of WARF hESC cells were imposed by exclusive licensing agreements that WARF had
entered into with Geron Corporation. Author’s interview of Carl Gulbrandsen, Mar. 19, 2020. See
also Matthew Herder, In (or out of) the Marketplace of Ideas: WARF v. Geron and Lessons for
Canada, 11 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 196 (2002) (discussing WARF litigation and settlement
with Geron over hESC technology).
60
See Golden, supra note 57, at 319-20; Amy Ligler, Egregious Error or Admirable Advance: The
Memorandum of Understanding That Enables Federally Funded Basic Human Embryonic Stem
Cell Research, 1 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 5 (2001).
61
According to Dr. Gulbrandsen, these restrictions were imposed by WARF’s institutional review
board (IRB) on grounds of protecting human research subjects. Gulbrandsen interview, supra note
59.
62
Sander Rabin, The gatekeepers of hES cell products, 23 NATURE BIOTECH. 817, 818 (2005).
63
Eli Kintisch, Groups Challenge Key Stem Cell Patents, 313 SCIENCE 281, 281 (2006).
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In early 2006, at the urging of NIH, WARF reduced the price of its hESC cells from
$5,000 to $500.64 Nevertheless, much of the academic research community
remained uncomfortable with WARF’s hESC licensing program.
3. Zerit and Access to Medicines
One of the most heated debates in the area of academic technology transfer has
concerned the accessibility of new biomedical products in the developing world. A
typical licensing pattern for a new drug involves the discovery and patenting of a
new compound by a university lab, followed by the university’s licensing of that
patent to a biotechnology or pharmaceutical company for further development,
testing, regulatory approval and commercialization.65 Many such licenses are
“exclusive”, meaning that the university is contractually prohibited from granting
rights under the patent to any other entity, and even from exploiting the patent itself,
at least in a particular field of use.66 The principal rationale for granting exclusive
rights is to induce the licensee to expend significant sums on the development of a
commercial product by guaranteeing it the sole ability to profit from the
commercialized invention to the exclusion of competitors.67 Once the patented
discovery is licensed to the company, decisions regarding the pricing and
distribution of the resulting product are generally left to the discretion of the
company.68
Thus, when a Yale University patent on the compound d4T (staudivine) was
licensed to Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) in 1988, the company received exclusive
rights to control the sale and marketing of the resulting anti-retroviral drug known
as Zerit.69 Zerit, a nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor similar to AZT, soon
became a critical part of the standard AIDS treatment regimen and by 1998 was the
most frequently prescribed anti-retroviral drug in the world.70 BMS priced Zerit
between $10,000 and $15,000 per year.71 However, when the international
64

See Loring & Campbell, supra note 58, at 1717; Golden, supra note 57, at 320.
See, e.g., JORGE L. CONTRERAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING AND TRANSACTIONS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 147 (0.9 ed. 2021) (describing licensing practices for new drugs)
[hereinafter CONTRERAS, LICENSING AND TRANSACTIONS].
66
See CONTRERAS, LICENSING AND TRANSACTIONS, supra note 65, at Ch. 8 – Intro. (Exclusivity).
67
See id. at Ch. 8.A (Exclusivity – Rationales and Policy).
68
From 1989 to 1995, the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) imposed “reasonable pricing”
constraints on drugs that were developed under cooperative R&D agreements (“CRADAs”)
between federal agencies and private industry. This requirement was discontinued by NIH in the
face of significant industry opposition. See Jorge L. Contreras, What Ever Happened to NIH’s “Fair
Pricing”
Clause?,
BILL
OF
HEALTH
(Aug.
20,
2020),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/04/nih-fair-pricing-drugs-covid19/.
69
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Yale Pressed to Help Cut Drug Costs in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2001, p. A3.
70
Ashley J. Stevens & April E. Effort, Using Academic License Agreements to Promote Global
Social Responsibility, LES NOUVELLES, Jun. 2008, 85, 87.
71
Yale School Med., After an Uproar, Price of AIDS Drug Falls in Africa, YALE MEDICINE
MAGAZINE, Spr. 2001; Julian Borger & Sarah Bosely, Campus revolt challenges Yale over $40m
Aids drug, GUARDIAN, Mar. 13, 2001.
65
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humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) asked BMS to permit
the Indian firm Cipla to import a generic version of Zerit into South Africa at a
price of $350 per year, BMS refused.72 The refusal sparked protests by Yale
students and faculty, including the original discoverer of d4T, who pointed out,
among other things, that Yale was earning approximately $40 million per year from
patent royalties on Zerit.73 As a result of this pressure, BMS agreed in March 2001
to make Zerit available in South Africa for $1 per day and to permit generic versions
to be sold as well.74
Yale was again in the limelight when, in 2006, it licensed a related compound
known as Ed4T to Japanese pharmaceutical manufacturer Oncolys.75 According to
the student-led organization Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM),
which emerged from the Zerit protests, Yale was forgetting the lessons that it had
learned in 2001.
In November 2006, UAEM produced a manifesto known as the Philadelphia
Consensus Statement76 which was signed by nearly four hundred students,
scientists, lawyers and activists.77 It called on universities to “promote equal access
to university research” by requiring that exclusive licensing agreements ensure lowcost access to health-related innovations in the developing world, to promote
research and development of neglected tropical diseases, and to measure the
success of research programs based on their impact on human welfare.78
4. Socially Responsible Licensing
The growing controversy over access to medicines prompted some universities
to reconsider their patent licensing policies with an eye toward improving access
for disadvantaged populations. One of the most prominent of these was the
University of California Berkeley. In 2003, Berkeley initiated a Socially
Responsible Licensing Program (SRLP) with the goal of promoting the
“affordability and accessibility of drugs, therapies, diagnostics, crops, and vaccines
to the developing world by stimulating investment where it has been traditionally
lacking under profit-motivated business models.”79
Berkeley’s SRLP achieved some notable early successes. For example, in the
first few years of the program, the university granted royalty-free licenses to
72

Yale School Med., supra note 71.
Yale School Med., supra note 71; Borger & Bosely, supra note 71.
74
Yale School Med., supra note 71; Stevens & Effort, supra note 70.
75
See Erika Check, Universities Urged to do More for Poor Nations, 444 NATURE 412, 413 (2006).
76
Philadelphia Consensus Statement on University Policies for Health-Related Innovations (Nov.
2006), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/amsa/uaem/PhiladelphiaConsensusStatement.pdf [hereinafter
Philadelphia Statement].
77
Check, supra note 75, at 412.
78
Philadelphia Statement, supra note 76.
79
Carol Mimura, Technology Licensing for the Benefit of the Developing World: UC Berkeley’s
Socially Responsible Licensing Program, 18 J. ASSN. UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS 15, 16 (2006).
73
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produce the malaria drug artemisinin, a handheld immune-diagnostic assay, and
disease-resistant crops, all in least-developed countries.80 In another deal, Berkeley
partnered with the government of Samoa to isolate the gene for the AIDS drug
Prostratin from the bark of the native mamala tree and to share any royalties with
the people of Samoa.81 By the end of 2005, Berkeley had completed ten different
agreements under its SRLP.82 Although there were calls for broader adoption of the
Berkeley SRLP model,83 few other universities followed Berkeley’s lead during the
mid-2000s.84
5. Universities and Patent Enforcement
While universities were not traditionally aggressive enforcers of their
intellectual property rights, by the late 1990s some universities had begun to assert
patents against alleged infringers with some vigor. For example, in 1994 Johns
Hopkins University sued CellPro, a manufacturer of devices used to purify stem
cells in connection with a leukemia therapy.85 The dispute resulted in a highlypublicized “march in” petition under the Bayh-Dole Act requesting that NIH
authorize CellPro to continue to operate under Hopkins’s patents to address unmet
public health needs.86 Twelve U.S. senators and twenty-five representatives wrote
letters in support of CellPro's petition.87 Nevertheless, the petition was denied,88
and the Federal Circuit ruled in 1997 that CellPro had willfully infringed the
patents.89
Then, in 2000, the University of Rochester sued Searle, Monsanto, Pfizer and
Pharmacia for infringing a university patent allegedly covering the blockbuster

80

See Mimura, supra note 79, at 19.
Robert Sanders, Landmark agreement between Samoa and UC Berkeley could help search for
AIDS cure, UC Berkeley Web Feature, Sept. 29, 2004.
82
Barry Bergman, Research patently in the public interest, BERKELEYAN, Dec. 2, 2005.
83
See Stevens & Effort, supra note 70, at 89 (recommending that all academic institutions “make
Socially Responsible Licensing a formal, stated institutional policy”).
84
Bergman, supra note 82 (“Berkeley's program remains the exception among university licensing
offices, even within the UC system”).
85
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 303, 308 (D. Del. 1996), aff’d 152 F.3d 1342
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
86
Harold Varmus, National Institutes of Health, Office of the Director, Determination in the Case
of Petition of CellPro, Inc., Aug. 1, 1997 [hereinafter CellPro Determination]. See also Mikhail,
supra note 4; Kevin W. McCabe, Implications of the "CellPro" Determination on Inventions Made
with Federal Assistance: Will the Government Ever Exercise Its March-In Right?, 27 PUBLIC
CONTRACT L.J. 645 (1998); Gretchen Dunbar, Real as Pro Wrestling: Johns Hopkins University v.
CellPro and the Federal Court's Power of Review in Patent Infringement Actions, 18 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 275 (2001).
87
See Eliot Marshall, NIH Nixes Appeal to Bypass Patent Law, 277 SCIENCE 759 (1997).
88
CellPro Determination, supra note 86, at 6 (“It would be inappropriate for the NIH, a public health
agency, to exercise its authorities under the Bayh-Dole Act to procure for CellPro more favorable
commercial terms than it can otherwise obtain from the Court or from the patent owners. CellPro's
commercial viability is best left to CellPro's management and the marketplace.”)
89
152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
81
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Cox-2 inhibitor marketed as Celebrex®.90 According to the New York Times,
university officials bragged when they brought the suit, predicting that the patent
“might become the most lucrative ever held by a university.”91 Yet the anticipated
returns never materialized, as the asserted patent was invalidated for lack of written
description.92 About the patent, the district judge wrote in 2003 that “the inventors
could no more be said to have possessed the complete invention claimed by the …
patent than the alchemists possessed a method of turning base metals into gold.”93
Rochester’s humiliating defeat became well known within the TTO community.
In addition, by the mid-2000s, there was a growing awareness in the United
States of the activity of patent assertion entities (“PAEs”) -- so-called “patent trolls”
– which acquire and assert patents for the primary purpose of earning revenue.94 In
his concurring opinion in eBay v. MercExchange,95 the landmark 2006 case that
redefined the standard for obtaining injunctive relief in patent cases, Justice
Anthony Kennedy cautioned that such entities could use the threat of injunctions
“to charge exorbitant fees” for patent licenses.96
The fact that universities, which generally produce no products, were obtaining
an increasing number of patents that they sought to license on a revenue-generating
basis, led prominent intellectual property professor Mark Lemley to ask in a 2006
speech, “Are Universities Patent Trolls?”97 In the speech, Lemley observed, “Time
and again, when I talk to people in a variety of industries, their view is that
universities are the new patent trolls. One even referred publicly to universities as
‘crack addicts’ driven by ‘small-minded tech transfer offices’ addicted to patent
royalties.”98 Though many university TTO officials likely disagreed with Lemley,99
they were certainly aware of the negative public light being shed on their patenting
and licensing practices.100
90

See Andrew Pollack, University's Drug Patent Is Invalidated by a Judge, NY TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003
(noting that Celebrex earned more than $3 billion per year).
91
Pollack, supra note 90.
92
University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216, 230 (W.D. NY 2003), aff’d
358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
93
Id. at 230.
94
See Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent
Law and Policy, ch. 3, p. 38 (Oct. 2003) (“NPEs obtain and enforce patents against other firms, but
either have no product or do not create or sell a product that is vulnerable to infringement countersuit
by the company against which the patent is being enforced.”)
95
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., , 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
96
547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
97
Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
611 (2008) (reproducing 2006 speech delivered to the Licensing Executives Society and AUTM).
98
Lemley, Universities, supra note 97, at 615 (quoting Chuck Fish, Comments at the Fordham
Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law & Policy (Apr. 22, 2006)).
99
Lemley, Universities, supra note 97, at 611 n.* (noting that many in his audience disagreed with
the implication of this question).
100
In the acknowledgements to his article, Lemley expressly thanks two TTO officials who attended
the Stanford meeting that led to the Nine Points document. Lemley, Universities, supra note 97, at
611 n.* (thanking Carl Gulbrandsen (WARF) and Kathy Ku (Stanford); Lemley also thanks Lita
Nelsen, the head of MIT’s TTO, though she did not attend the Stanford meeting herself).
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In addition to the possibility that universities themselves were acting like PAEs,
concerns existed over universities’ licensing of technology to PAEs. In 1997, for
example, Columbia University licensed several of its patents covering the MPEG2 digital video compression standard to a patent pool known as MPEG LA. As it
announced in a July 1997 press release, “Columbia University, the only academic
institution in the patent pool … expects to begin receiving license fees from the
technology as early as this year.”101 The director of Columbia’s TTO reiterated that
“the patent pool approach offers Columbia an excellent opportunity to receive
significant royalty payments over the next few years.”102 With this focus on royalty
revenue earned through the MPEG-2 pool, some observers asked whether
Columbia had become part of a PAE.103
6. National Security and University Research
The export of sensitive military technologies from the United States has long
been restricted under a variety of regulatory regimes. During the Cold War, fears
arose that scientific research conducted at American universities could be utilized
by enemy states, thus endangering U.S. national security.104 The academic
community responded with concern that fundamental scientific research could be
hampered by excessive restrictions on international collaboration. In 1985,
President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189),
which provides that basic and applied research in science and engineering, as
distinguished from proprietary research and industrial development, design,
production, and product utilization, should remain free from export restrictions, so
long as the relevant information is not classified.105
Concerns over the leakage of sensitive information from academic research
centers again emerged after the September 11, 2001 attacks. While various federal
agencies reaffirmed the validity of NSDD-189,106 high-level discussions of the
appropriate scope of oversight and control over academic research continued. In
early 2006, with the backing of the House Committee on Science and Technology
and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the
National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health requested that
101

Columbia Univ., Press Release: Justice Department Approves Digital TV Patent Pool; Columbia,
Only
University
in
Group,
To
Receive
Fees,
Jul.
1,
1997,
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/pr/96_99/19161.html.
102
Columbia Univ., supra note 101.
103
See Julie Hopkins, When Pools Act Like Trolls, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Nov 27, 2013
(updated Sep 26, 2018), (“some view MPEG LA as more of an offensive acting patent troll than a
patent pool”)
104
See Natl. Research Council, Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World: A Report Based on
Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities 28 (2007) [hereinafter NRC
Science & Security].
105
National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information, September
21, 1985.
106
NRC Science & Security, supra note 104, at 30.
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the National Research Council’s Committee on Science, Technology, and Law
form an ad hoc Committee on a New Government-University Partnership for
Science and Security. This eleven-member committee was charged with analyzing
these issues and making recommendations regarding any new measures that should
be taken to address them. One of the members of the committee was Arthur
Bienenstock of Stanford University, who had also been actively engaged in
discussions of university intellectual property policy. As discussed in Part II.A,
Bienenstock was one of the organizers of the Stanford meeting in 2006 that led to
the creation of the Nine Points document.
II. CREATION OF THE NINE POINTS DOCUMENT
A. The Stanford Summit
By July 2006, the issues described in Part I.C above were becoming the subjects
of increasing discussion among university administrators and technology
managers. In response, Arthur Bienenstock, Vice Provost and Dean of Research
and Graduate Policy at Stanford University, together with Kathy Ku, the head of
Stanford’s TTO, felt that leading academic institutions could develop a consensus
around appropriate responses to many of these issues. Bienenstock, in particular,
wished to ensure that both senior university research administrators as well as TTO
directors and managers were involved in such a conversation, so that both
commercial and broader programmatic perspectives on university technology
licensing would be considered.107
Bienenstock and Ku convened a meeting at Stanford to which they invited both
TTO and research policy officials from Berkeley, CalTech, Columbia, Cornell,
Harvard, MIT, University of Illinois (both Chicago and Urbana-Champaign),
University of Washington, WARF and Yale. In addition to these universities, the
Association of American Medical Colleges, a trade association then chaired by
David Korn, the former dean of Stanford Medical School, also participated.
According to attendees, it was the first such meeting ever to be convened.
The organizers asked each attendee to be prepared to discuss his or her top two
or three issues relating to university technology transfer. Twenty-five to thirty
individuals attended.108 They sat around a large round conference table and each
person was given the opportunity to express his or her views in turn, after which
the group engaged in a discussion which, according to attendees, was intense but
cordial.109
One of the principal purposes of the meeting was to address concerns
surrounding WARF’s hESC licensing program. During the meeting, WARF’s
107

Author’s interviews, conducted March 2020.
Author’s interviews, conducted March 2020.
109
Author’s interviews, conducted March 2020.
108
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Managing Director, Carl Gulbrandsen, explained the rationales for the licensing
practices that had attracted the ire of some researchers, and also that WARF had
already amended some of these practices to be less onerous. It soon became
apparent that the participants wished to discuss a broad range of issues affecting
university technology transfer and the relationship between universities and the
private sector, well beyond WARF. Some coordination among universities on these
issues was viewed as desirable, so as to present a more consistent front to private
entities with which universities were negotiating.110 Finally, Carol Mimura, the
head of Berkeley’s TTO, and John Soderstrom, who led the Yale TTO, were
particularly interested in humanitarian licensing and access to medicines issues.111
The initial goal of the Stanford meeting had not been to produce a document,
but as consensus began to develop around certain principles, participants suggested
that these be recorded. Small drafting groups were formed and over the following
months these were refined and combined. By March, 2007, the resulting Nine
Points document had been created and approved by twelve of the thirteen
participants at the Stanford meeting.112

B.

The Nine Points – Point-by-Point

The Nine Points document not only articulates general principles applicable to
academic technology licensing, it also proposes specific contractual text intended
to implement many of those principles (“Recommended Clauses”). There are a total
of twenty-four distinct Recommended Clauses (some duplicated in Points 2 and 5),
which are summarized below.
Point 1 - Universities should reserve the right to practice licensed inventions
and to allow other non-profit and governmental organizations to do so
As noted in Part x, above, many university technology licenses are exclusive,
meaning that the licensed rights cannot be utilized by anyone other than the
licensee. Without an express reservation of rights, exclusivity prevents even the
owner of the licensed rights (i.e., the university) from practicing those rights. Thus,
if a university practices a right that it has exclusively licensed to another, it may be
found to infringe its own intellectual property. These considerations gave rise to
three distinct suggestions in Point 1 of the Nine Points Document.
(a)

Education. Under the first clause recommended by Point 1, a university
licensor would reserve the right to practice licensed technology internally
for educational purposes. This right is of clear relevance to universities, as

110

The degree to which universities could legally engage in such coordination was also discussed,
and at least one participant expressed concern about potential antitrust liability associated with such
concerted action. Author’s interviews, conducted March 2020.
111
Author’s interviews, conducted March 2020.
112
Columbia University did not sign the Nine Points document.
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many, if not most, university inventions are created by academic faculty
who have either direct or indirect teaching responsibilities. Education is also
a primary function of universities, making it imperative that the right to
conduct this important activity be carefully preserved notwithstanding a
university’s exclusive licensing of technology to third parties.113
(b)

Research. Because academic researchers often continue to conduct
research on technologies that their universities have licensed to others, it is
important for universities to retain sufficient rights to conduct this research.
Such contractual reservations of rights became even more important after
the Federal Circuit’s 2002 decision in Madey v. Duke University, which
established that there is no general ‘experimental use defense’ that
immunizes university researchers from claims of patent infringement.114
The drafters of the Nine Points document expressly sought to counteract the
effects of Madey by proposing contractual reservations to the exclusivity
granted under typical patent licensing agreements for internal research
purposes (including research sponsored by commercial entities).115

(c)

Materials Transfer. The WARF controversy discussed in Part I.C.2, above,
highlighted for many universities the need to reserve the right to transfer
tangible research materials (e.g., biological and chemical compounds) as
well as computer software, databases and know-how, to third parties,
particularly non-profit and governmental entities. Point 1 thus suggests
contractual language that permits universities to make such transfers
notwithstanding the grant of exclusive rights to third party licensees.

Three sample clauses implementing these reservations of rights are included in
the appendix to the Nine Points document.
Point 2 - Exclusive licenses should be structured in a manner that encourages
technology development and use
Point 5 - Ensure broad access to research tools

113

See Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Vroom, 186 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999) (professor’s reservation of rights
in exclusive license agreement was insufficient to conduct certain executive education and
consulting activities).
114
307 F.3d 1351, x (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2639 (holding that the experimental
use defense is “very narrow and limited to actions performed for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity,
or for strictly philosophical inquiry”).
115
The reference to corporate sponsorship of university research was likely a direct response to
WARF’s prohibition on the use of its licensed hESC lines for sponsored research. See note x, supra.
For a general discussion of university sponsored research, see CONTRERAS, LICENSING AND
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 65, at 394-97.
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Points 2 and 5 respond to the concerns discussed in Part I.C.1, above, regarding
the exclusive licensing of university technology, and research tools in particular.
Point 2 cautions that
A license grant that encompasses all fields of use for the life
of the licensed patent(s) may have negative consequences if
the subject technology is found to have unanticipated utility.
This possibility is particularly troublesome if the licensee is
not able or willing to develop the technology in fields outside
of its core business.116
In some cases, however, the Nine Points document recognizes that exclusive
licenses may be justified, such as “[w]hen significant investment of time and
resources in a technology are needed in order to achieve … broad implementation”
of an invention.117 In such cases, Point 2 counsels that “it is important that licensees
commit to diligently develop the technology to protect against a licensee that is
unable or unwilling to move an innovation forward.”118 These provisions seek to
prevent a technology from being locked up in the hands of an unproductive
licensee, which would deprive others of the benefits of the technology.119
Concerns regarding research tools are related. The discussion in Point 5 cites
the NIH Guidelines on Research Tools,120 noting that “universities are expected to
make research tools as broadly available as possible.”121 To this end, Point 5
suggests that exclusive licenses of research tools should be limited, though not
prohibited outright.
Points 2 and 5 offer a total of twelve different Recommended Clauses to address
this set of related concerns. These Recommended Clauses are grouped into six subcategories based on their overall goals and approach:
(1)

Milestone Penalties. Point 2 contains three related Recommended Clauses
regarding a university’s ability to terminate or limit a licensee’s exclusivity

116

Nine Points document, supra note 9, at 2. This issue is discussed by Contreras and Sherkow in
the context of the foundational patents covering the CRISPR gene editing technology. Contreras &
Sherkow, supra note 22, at 700 (“the exclusive licenses granted to the institutions’ surrogates for
human therapeutics limit access to CRISPR as a platform technology, potentially hindering
competition and creating innovation bottlenecks.”)
117
Nine Points document, supra note 9, at 2.
118
Nine Points document, supra note 9, at 3.
119
The risk is aptly illustrated by the unfortunate case of the University of Utah’s patent on a gene
associated with a fatal cardiac irregularity known as Long QT syndrome. The university granted an
exclusive license of the patent to a company that soon went bankrupt, suspending all activity relating
to the gene for two years, during which no other lab could perform diagnostic tests on the gene and
invariably leading to loss of life. See Misha Angrist, Subhashini Chandrasekharan, Christopher
Heaney, Robert Cook-Deegan, Impact of gene patents and licensing practices on access to genetic
testing for long QT syndrome, 12 GENETICS IN MED. S111 (2010).
120
NIH Guidelines, supra note 47.
121
Nine Points document, supra note 9, at 5.
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if the licensee fails to meet contractual commercialization and development
milestones. Such clauses, which can result in termination of the entire
agreement, a particular licensed field of use, or the licensee’s exclusivity in
a particular licensed field of use incentivize a licensee to work diligently
toward the achievement of mutually agreed commercialization milestones
and permits a university to offer the technology to others if the licensee
underperforms.
(2)

Public Health/Medical Use. Responding specifically to the access issues
raised by the Zerit controversy and related debates, Point 2 includes five
Recommended Clauses that would permit a university to authorize third
parties to operate within an exclusive licensee’s field when necessary to
address unmet market or public health needs, to require the licensee to grant
sublicenses to address such needs, and to permit healthcare providers,
clinical researchers and public health authorities to operate within the
exclusive field. Some of these issues are also addressed under Point 9.

(3)

Limit Sale but not Use. Points 2 and 5 recommend that, in some cases, the
scope of an exclusive license could be limited to encompass only the sale
of licensed products, but not their use.122 For example, if a university patent
claims a genomic analysis technique,123 the exclusive licensee would have
the exclusive right to sell testing apparatus embodying that technique, but
could not prevent individual labs from employing the technique with
equipment that they created themselves or obtained from a third party.124
Thus, the exclusive licensee could seek to enforce the licensed patent
against a competing manufacturer of testing equipment, but not against a
laboratory or hospital using that equipment, even if that use might otherwise
be infringing. In this way, Clause 2(3) could achieve an outcome similar to
Clause 2(2), but without limiting the scope of permitted use to healthcare or
any other particular field. It also creates a broad, contractual research
exemption to fill the gap left by Madey v. Duke,125 permitting researchers

122

The basis for this distinction arises from the exclusive rights granted to a patent holder under 35
U.S.C. 271 to make, use, sell, offer for sale or import a patented article. The Recommended Clause
is directed to patent claims covering equipment and apparatus, but not necessarily to patent claims
covering methods or processes.
123
The concerns expressed in this section of Point 2 seem to arise from public concerns over the
patenting of human genes and the exclusive licensing of those genes to companies like Myriad
Genetics, which exploited its position as the sole authorized provider of BRCA1/2 diagnostic testing
in the United States to prevent both further research on the technique and the use of the technique
in multi-gene analysis. See Jorge L. Contreras, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics: A Critical Reassessment, 27 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 1, 47-48 (2020) (describing
controversial role of University of Utah in exclusive licensing of BRCA gene patents).
124
The Nine Points document also mentions equipment obtained by the user from the exclusive
licensee, Nine Points document, supra note 9, at 3, but in actuality the use of that equipment would
generally require no license at all, as the relevant patents would, in most cases, be exhausted upon
the licensee’s sale to the user. See Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Intl., Inc., 581 U.S. ___
(2017).
125
See notes x, supra, and accompanying text.
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to use patented technologies so long as they do not eventually sell products
embodying those technologies.
(4)

Non-Exclusive Licensing of Research Tools. Consistent with the NIH
Guidelines, Points 2 and 5 recommend that broadly applicable research
tools be licensed only on a non-exclusive basis. Such non-exclusive
licensing is intended to make such tools as widely available as possible,
notwithstanding the revenue that might be available to a university granting
an exclusive license with respect to these tools. While this recommendation
is stated strongly, it is not accompanied by any specific Recommended
Clauses, as the result in question would simply be achieved by granting a
license that is non-exclusive rather than exclusive.

(5)

Professional Education and Training. Point 2 recommends that the scope
of exclusivity be limited to permit an exclusively licensed technology to be
used freely by third parties for professional education and training purposes.
This proposed exclusion goes beyond that of Clause 1.a, which permits a
university licensor to use an exclusively licensed technology for its own
educational purposes. Clause 2(5) extends that educational right to third
parties, as well.

(6)

Quality Control. The final clause recommended by Point 2 is an exclusion
from exclusivity to permit third parties to operate under a licensed
technology in order to perform quality verification and control. This issue
received significant attention in the years preceding the Nine Points
document, particularly in the area of genetic testing for variants in the
BRCA1/2 genes, which had been patented by the University of Utah and
licensed exclusively to Myriad Genetics. Myriad, which was the only lab
in the United States authorized to perform BRCA diagnostic testing, refused
to permit third parties to conduct tests to confirm its results. Opponents
claimed that “false positive” results from Myriad could thus lead patients to
receive unnecessary prophylactic surgery.126
Point 3 - Strive to minimize the licensing of “future improvements”

The authors of the Nine Points document were concerned by contractual
provisions that required a university to grant its licensee rights to future
improvements of a licensed technology, at least without additional payment. Such
provisions, the authors note, “may effectively enslave a faculty member’s research

126

See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 207
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d 569 U.S. 576 (2013) (“Plaintiffs contend that as a result of the patents-insuit, BRCA1/2 genetic testing is one of the very few tests performed as part of breast cancer care
and prevention for which a doctor or patient cannot get a second confirmatory test done through
another laboratory.”)
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program” to the licensee.127 The Nine Points document thus encourages universities
to avoid contractual provisions that grant licensees automatic rights to
improvements or follow-on inventions made at the university or by inventors at
other institutions. Three Recommended Clauses are included, each limiting a
licensee’s right with respect to improvements to the licensed technology made by
the university or others.
Point 4 - Universities should anticipate and help to manage technology
transfer related conflicts of interest
Point 4 recommends that university TTOs be sensitive to conflicts of interest
that may arise between investigators and institutions, on one hand, and corporate
sponsors and licensees, on the other. The issue of financial conflicts in the academic
setting has increased in prominence over the years, and many academic institutions
have adopted formal conflicts of interest policies and internal review processes.128
Point 4, however, contains no specific suggestions regarding language for licensing
agreements.
Point 5 – Ensure broad access to research tools
See Point 2, above.
Point 6 - Enforcement action should be carefully considered
Point 6 concerns the enforcement of university-owned intellectual property
against third parties. The participants at the Stanford meeting were well-aware of
increasing patent enforcement activity by universities, including the University of
Rochester’s humiliating defeat a few years earlier.129 These incidents raised
awareness among university officials of the pitfalls of patent enforcement,
particularly the potential reputational damage to the universities involved and to the
university system in general.130
Point 6 thus begins by discouraging universities from initiating litigation except
as a last resort, urging them to “be mindful of their primary mission to use patents

127

Nine Points document, supra note 9, at 4.
See Jorge L. Contreras & Mark D. Rinehart, Conflicts of Interest and Academic Research, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 143 (Jacob H.
Rooksby ed., 2020).
129
See notes x, supra, and accompanying text.
130
Nine Points document, supra note 9, at 6 (“Under all circumstances, it reflects poorly on
universities to be involved in ‘nuisance suits.’”) See also Walter D. Valdivia, Patent infringement
suits have a reputational cost for universities, BROOKINGS TECHTANK, Nov. 10, 2015; NRC
University Report, supra note 14, at 7 (“Enforcement of IP rights against suspected infringers should
be approached carefully to protect the institution’s resources and reputation”).
128
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to promote technology development for the benefit of society”.131 It further notes
that “[l]itigation is seldom the preferred option for resolving disputes.”132 If
litigation is initiated, “it should be with a clear, mission-oriented rationale for doing
so -- one that can be clearly articulated both to its internal constituencies and to the
public.”133 These recommendations are directed at university decisions, and as such
do not translate to specific Recommended Clauses in university licensing
agreements.
However, the same concerns exist with respect to litigation brought by
university licensees. Under the procedural rules of standing and joinder, a patent
owner may be joined involuntarily in an enforcement action brought by its
exclusive licensee.134 Thus, a university could suffer similar reputational harm if
its licensee brought an ill-advised patent enforcement suit. Accordingly, Point 6
recommends that university licensing agreements require exclusive licensees to
consult with, or obtain the permission of, the university prior to initiating patent
infringement litigation.135
Point 7 – Be mindful of export regulations
As noted in Part I.C.6, above, the national security implications of university
research were the subject of intense, high-level discussions during the period that
the Nine Points document was under development. And several individuals
involved in the national security discussion, principally Arthur Bienenstock from
Stanford, were also key players in the development of the Nine Points document.136
It is thus not surprising that Point 7 refers explicitly to export regulations in the
context of university technology transfer and urges university TTOs to be
particularly sensitive to export laws and regulations. Yet, despite the extensive
body of federal regulations relating to technology exports, Point 7 is remarkably
short, consisting of a single paragraph that has only one suggestion for university
licensing agreements: that they require the licensee to comply with applicable
export laws and regulations.
Point 8 - Be mindful of the implications of working with patent aggregators

131

Nine Points document, supra note 9, at 6.
Nine Points document, supra note 9, at 6.
133
Id.
134
See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 19, 20; Independent Wireless Telegraph Co v. Radio Corp of America, 269
US 459 (1926) (an exclusive licensee should be able to join the patent owner, involuntarily if need
be, to maintain suit).
135
Such a clause is relevant only with respect to exclusive licenses, as non-exclusive licensees
typically do not have the right to initiate litigation to enforce licensed rights. See Rite-Hite Corp. v.
Kelly Co. Inc., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
136
NRC Science & Security, supra note 104.
132
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Point 8 addresses the issues raised by the licensing of university patents to
patent assertion entities.137 The Nine Points document suggests a contractual clause
requiring licensees to operate under a business model that encourages
commercialization and does not rely primarily on threats of infringement litigation
to generate revenue. Such a clause would, in effect, prevent a university from
licensing a technology to a PAE.
Point 9 - Consider including provisions that address unmet needs, such as
those of neglected patient populations or geographic areas, giving particular
attention to improved therapeutics, diagnostics and agricultural technologies for
the developing world
Point 9 addresses the access to medicines issues presented by Zerit and similar
incidents in the 1990s and early 2000s.138 In doing so, it seeks to codify the public
interest principles pioneered by the Berkeley SRLP,139 asking universities to
refocus on their public missions in addition to considerations of financial gain in
technology licensing transactions. Point 9 specifically encourages universities to
include in relevant licensing agreements provisions ensuring that underprivileged
populations have low- or no-cost access to adequate quantities of licensed medical
innovations.
As the above discussion indicates, the Nine Points document was not a
wholesale attempt to re-align university patent licensing practices with the public
interest, as its title might suggest. Rather, the Nine Points embody a range of
compromises across different substantive domains (exclusivity, materials transfer,
enforcement, national security and access to medicines), reflecting the different
priorities and experiences of the Nine Points drafters. As shown in the next Part,
this diversity of approaches has resulted in widely varying levels of uptake of the
different Nine Points recommendations.
III. MEASURING THE NINE POINTS
In order to assess the impact of the Nine Points document on university
technology licensing practices, the researchers undertook the first empirical study
of the implementation of the contractual provisions recommended by the Nine
Points document both before and after its adoption. Our findings are presented
below.

137

See Part I.C.5, supra.
See Part x, supra.
139
See Part x, supra.
138
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A. Methodology
The AUTM website identifies each signatory to the Nine Points document
(Signatories).140 As noted above, there were 118 Signatories as of September 2021.
Based on Internet searches and other public data, this study independently
determined for each Signatory: the entity type (academic/medical institution,
service provider (e.g., law firm, advertising firm), company, association, or
governmental entity) and its geographic location (US, Canada, Latin America,
Europe, Africa, Australia/NZ or Asia Pacific). This study also determined for each
Signatory the year in which it signed the Nine Points document based on successive
searches of past versions of the AUTM website using the Internet Archive
(waybackmachine).141
We next collected patent licensing agreements entered into by
academic/medical institutions (both Signatories and non-Signatories) before and
after the creation of the Nine Points document. Because patent licensing agreements
are typically confidential, most are unavailable for public review. However, it is a
requirement of Regulation S-K promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934142 that publicly traded companies in the United
States (registrants) file with the SEC “[e]very contract not made in the ordinary
course of business that is material to the registrant”, specifically including contracts
“upon which the registrant's business is substantially dependent, as in the case of
… any franchise or license or other agreement to use a patent, formula, trade secret,
process or trade name upon which registrant's business depends to a material
extent.”143 Thus, to the extent that an academic institution enters into a patent
license agreement with a publicly-traded company to which the agreement is
material (or a private company that later becomes publicly-traded), the agreement
must be filed with the SEC, even though the academic institution itself has no SEC
filing obligations. Accordingly, our primary source of agreements for this study
was the public Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR)
database operated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.144
During the summer of 2020, we conducted searches on EDGAR to identify
agreements in which academic institutions licensed patents to other parties.145 We
obtained 136 agreements meeting these criteria. We obtained an additional 68
agreements from KTMine, a private database vendor, which also sourced these
140

See Nine Points Signatories, supra note 12.
http://web.archive.org
142
17 CFR § 229.601.
143
17 CFR § 229.601(b)(10)(ii)(b).
144
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. In most cases, agreements that are
available on EDGAR have been granted “confidential treatment” by the SEC with respect to specific
words and phrases deemed to be of competitive significance. These words and phrases are thus
redacted in the publicly-available documents. However, given the nature of this inquiry, these
redactions did not have a material impact on our review of the agreements.
145
To conduct this search we utilized a variety of related Boolean queries containing the terms
“licens*” and “university” or “institute*”.
141
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agreements from EDGAR. Fourteen agreements were provided to us by Professor
Colleen Chien, who obtained them via a series of Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests to the SEC in 2015. Six agreements were obtained by the author
through independent federal and state FOIA requests. We thus reviewed a total of
224 unique patent license agreements (Reviewed Agreements) to which 85
different academic institutions were parties.146 A list of all 224 Reviewed
Agreements is contained in the Appendix.
We manually reviewed each Reviewed Agreement to determine its parties, date,
exclusivity or non-exclusivity, industry sector and whether the academic party was
a signatory to the Nine Points document. We then reviewed the text of each
Reviewed Agreement for the presence or absence of each Recommended Clause
included in the Nine Points document (see Part II.B, above).
Finally, we identified the total 2019 research budget for each U.S. academic
institution that was either a Signatory or a party to one of the Reviewed Agreements
based on data reported by the National Science Foundation.147

B.

Findings

This Part III.B presents the findings of this study regarding the characteristics
of the signatories to the Nine Points document, the Reviewed Agreements, and the
presence or absence of the Recommended Clauses in each of these agreements. An
analysis of the implications of these findings follows in Part IV.
1. Characteristics of the Nine Points Signatories
As noted above, twelve entities – eleven U.S. universities and the AAMC –
signed the Nine Points document in March 2007. Following its creation, 106
additional entities signed the Nine Points document. Figure 1 below illustrates the
accession, by year, of additional entities to the Nine Points document (“OS”
indicates the Original Signature date of March 6, 2007, and 2007 indicates
signatures occurring between March 7 and December 31, 2007).

146

Based on data obtained from the AUTM STATT database, it is estimated that U.S. universities
entered into a total of approximately 20,000 exclusive licensing agreements between 1992 and 2018.
Our sample thus represents approximately 1% of the total set of such agreements, with a 95%
confidence level and margin of error of 7%.
147
Natl. Sci. Fndn., Higher education R&D expenditures at higher education institutions in both
survey populations, ranked by all R&D expenditures, by source of funds: FY 2019,
https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf21314#utm_source=miragenews&utm_medium=miragenews&utm_
campaign=news [hereinafter NSF 2019 R&D Report].
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Figure 1

Nine Points Signatories by Year (n=117)
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As shown in Figure 1, accession to the Nine Points document was highest in
the years immediately following its creation (2007-2008), followed by a decline
over the next few years (2009-2014), and a mere trickle thereafter. Institutions that
adopted the Nine Points in 2007 and 2008 were likely responding to the initial
endorsement by the original twelve signatories and subsequent encouragement by
AUTM, which distributed the Nine Points document to its membership in 2007,
urging “adoption and implementation by the wider community of universities.”148
Some of the implications of the adoption rate of the Nine Points document are
discussed in Part IV.A, below.
The original signatories of the Nine Points were all major U.S. institutions.
Though non-U.S. entities have subsequently signed the Nine Points document, the
large majority of its Signatories (87, 74%) continue to be U.S.-based. Other
geographies represented include Europe (12), Canada (5), Latin America (3),
China/Japan/Korea (3), India/Pakistan (2) and South Africa (2). Figure 2 below
illustrates the geographic distribution of Signatories as of September 2020.

148

Patrick L. Jones, AUTM Recommends Universities Review the ‘Nine Points to Consider in
Licensing University Technology’ (2007). AUTM clearly viewed the Nine Points document as a
means for repairing damage to the public image of university technology transfer. As its President
wrote in 2007, “Given the current political environment that questions the motives and methods
underlying our activities … it is important that the principles used to support our decision-making
be recognized as serving the best interest of our nation -- not just our individual institutions.” Id.
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Figure 2

Nine Points Signatories, by Geography
(n=117)
ANZ, 3

Canada, 5
CJK, 3

Europe, 12

India/Pak, 2
Lat. Am., 3
S. Afr., 2

USA, 87

ANZ

Canada

CJK

Europe

India/Pak

Lat. Am.

S. Afr.

USA

Given that the Nine Points document is directed specifically toward university
licensing, the large majority of Signatories (96, 82%) are academic institutions,
including universities and academic medical centers. Other Signatories include
trade associations and organizations serving the academic community (8), service
providers such as law firms and consultants (6), companies (4), government
agencies (2) and a charitable foundation (1).149 Figure 3 below illustrates the
breakdown of Signatories by entity type as of September 2020.

149

It is not clear what non-academic institutions signify by signing the Nine Points document. They
may sign to show support for the principles espoused in the Nine Points document, to encourage
universities to adopt the recommendations of the Nine Points document, or because they intend to
modify their own patent licensing practices to conform to the recommendations of the Nine Points
document.
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Figure 3

Nine Points Signatories, by Entity Type
(n=118)
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Combining geographical and sectoral data, the largest group of Signatories (75,
64%) consists of U.S.-based academic institutions, followed by non-U.S. academic
institutions (21, 12%). One Korean and one European governmental agency are
Signatories. Of the four for-profit companies that are Signatories, two are
European, one is Chinese, and one is based in the U.S. Service providers include
four U.S. and two Canadian entities; and the eight trade associations include six
U.S., one Canadian and one Indian entity.
As described in Part III.A, we also identified the total 2019 research
expenditures made by U.S.-based academic Signatories, which we use as a proxy
for the general size of the institution’s research enterprise. The original eleven
academic Signatories were generally very large research institutions, with ten
reporting annual research expenditures in excess of one billion dollars.150 Over the
years, however, a number of smaller research institutions signed the Nine Points
document, so that by 2021, institutions with total research budgets of less than $5
million had become signatories.151 At the same time, as discussed in Part IV.A,
below, many of the largest research institutions in the U.S. have still not signed the
Nine Points document.

150

For purposes of research expenditure reporting, University of Illinois Chicago and University of
Illinois Urbana-Champlain report as a single entity, with combined expenditures of approximately
$1.1 billion. See AUTM 2020 Survey, supra note 1; NSF 2019 R&D Report, supra note 147.
151
E.g., Worcester Polytechnic Institute and Boise State University. AUTM, Nine Points
Signatories, supra note 12; AUTM 2020 Survey, supra note 1.
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2. License Agreement Characteristics
As noted in Part III.A, we collected 224 unique Reviewed Agreements. The
licensors in 142 Reviewed Agreements (63%) were academic institutions that have
signed the Nine Points document (Signatories).152 The twelve original Signatories
were licensors in 57 of these Reviewed Agreements (25% of the total). Academic
institutions that have not signed the Nine Points document (non-Signatories) were
licensors in the remaining 82 Reviewed Agreements (37%).
Reviewed Agreements had execution dates ranging from 1991 to 2018. A total
of 120 of these Reviewed Agreements (54%) were executed prior to the creation of
the Nine Points document in March 2007153 and 104 (46%) were executed after that
date. Of the 142 Reviewed Agreements to which Signatories were parties, 89 (63%)
were executed prior to the licensor’s signature of the Nine Points document and 53
(37%) were executed after to the licensor’s signature of the Nine Points document.
Figure 4 illustrates the date range of the Reviewed Agreements by year.
Figure 4

Eighty-five (85) different academic institutions are licensors under the
Reviewed Agreements. Of these, 36 (42%) are Nine Points Signatories and 49
(58%) are non-Signatories. Table 1 shows the sixteen academic institutions that are
parties to five or more Reviewed Agreements, together with the year that such
152

Our focus is on university licensors only. While universities are sometimes licensees, these
licensing agreements are seldom accessible to the public.
153
One agreement with a non-signatory having a stated execution date of March 15, 2007 was
counted as being executed prior to the Nine Points document, given the likelihood that the agreement
was drafted and negotiated prior to the formal March 6 date of the Nine Points document.
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institutions became Signatories (if at all) and the number of Reviewed Agreements
to which each such institution is a party.
Table 1
Top Institutional Parties to Reviewed Agreements
Institution
University of California (system)
University of Texas (system)
Johns Hopkins University
Stanford University
University of Pennsylvania
Wisconsin Alumni Research Fndn.
California Inst. Technology
Columbia University
Duke University
Massachusetts Inst. Technology
University of Colorado
University of Florida
University of Illinois
University of Massachusetts
University of Michigan
University of Washington

Year Signed
9P*
OS
2007154
n/a
OS
2009
OS
OS
n/a
2007
OS
2007
2007
OS
2008155
2007
OS

No. of Reviewed Agreements
Pre-9P
Post-9P
Total
11
5
16
2
8
10
n/a
n/a
7
3
4
7
6
0
6
3
3
6
4
1
5
n/a
n/a
5
4
1
5
4
1
5
2
3
5
3
2
5
3
2
5
4
1
5
2
3
5
3
3
5
51
37
102

* “OS” indicates an original signatory to the Nine Points document; “n/a” indicates
an institution that has not signed the Nine Points document.
As shown in Table 1, two “top” academic licensors in our sample – Johns
Hopkins and Columbia – are not Signatories to the Nine Points document. Of the
remaining fourteen licensors, only the University of Pennsylvania is a licensor on
agreements all of which were signed prior to its becoming a Signatory to the Nine
Points document. The remaining thirteen licensors were parties to Reviewed
Agreements that were signed both before and after the licensor became a Signatory.
The large majority of Reviewed Agreements (215, 96%) included an exclusive
license grant. The remainder were co-exclusive (2) or non-exclusive (7). The
prevalence of exclusive licenses among Reviewed Agreements is not surprising.
First, for a variety of commercial reasons, the large majority of university license
agreements are exclusive.156 Second, our sample was derived largely from
“material” agreements filed by licensees with the SEC, and an exclusive license is
likely both to be more valuable to the licensee and to involve higher payments (thus
more likely than a non-exclusive license to be material to the registrant).
154

The University of Texas Health Science Center, San Antonio and University of Texas Medical
Branch each signed the Nine Points document in 2007 (though not as original Signatories).
University of Texas, Austin signed the Nine Points document in 2011.
155
The University of Massachusetts, Lowell signed the Nine Points document in 2008.
156
See Lemley, Trolls, supra note 97, at 617 (“the overwhelming majority of university patent
licenses are exclusive”).
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We also manually coded the primary technical field to which each Reviewed
Agreement relates. As shown in Figure 5, below, the large majority of Reviewed
Agreements (186, 83%) relate to technologies in the biomedical/biopharma field,
including genetics and genomics. Approximately 8% (17) of Reviewed Agreements
concerned medical devices or medical techniques, while smaller numbers related
to electrical and electronics (12), chemical and materials (7) and mechanical and
manufacturing technologies (2).
Figure 5

Reviewed Agreements, by Field (n=224)
Mechanical/Mfg, 2

Med devices/methods, 17

Electrical, 12
Chemical/materials, 7

Bipmedical/pharma,
186

Bipmedical/pharma

Chemical/materials

Mechanical/Mfg

Med devices/methods

Electrical

3. Adoption of Recommended Clauses in University License
Agreements
As noted in Part III.A, we coded each Reviewed Agreement for occurrence or
non-occurrence of each of the Recommended Clauses discussed in Part II.B. We
then compared the total occurrences of each such Recommended Clause across all
Reviewed Agreements before and after the March 16, 2007, the date on which the
Nine Points document was released (“Nine Points Date”). We further compared the
occurrence of each Recommended Clause in Reviewed Agreements to which Nine
Points Signatories were parties, both before and after each such Signatory signed
the Nine Points document, and to which non-Signatories were parties, both before
and after the Nine Points Date. Descriptive statistics reflecting these results are
contained in Table 2 and graphically displayed in Figure 6. A discussion of the
potential implications of these findings follows in Part IV.C, below.
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Table 2
Clause-by-Clause Comparison of Reviewed Agreements157

157

Recommended Clause 2(4) was not measurable (see below). Point 4 contains no Recommended
Clauses. Point 5 is addressed together with Point 2.
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Figure 6

a. Explanation of Variables
Row 1 of Table 2 shows the frequency with which each Recommended Clause
appears in the full set of Reviewed Agreements, and Row 2 shows the percentage
of all Reviewed Agreements in which each such Recommended Clause appears.
Rows 3 and 5 show the frequency with which each Recommended Clause appears
in Reviewed Agreements signed before and after the Nine Points Date. A
comparison of Rows 3 and 5 reveals the likely effect of the Nine Points document
on the inclusion of a particular Recommended Clause in an agreement. Row 7
shows the difference in the normalized occurrence frequency of a Recommended
Clause before and after the Nine Points Date. Thus, a negative result in Row 7
indicates that the Recommended Clause appeared less frequently after the Nine
Points Date, a positive result indicates that the Recommended Clause appeared
more frequently after the Nine Points Date, and zero indicates that there was no
measurable change in the occurrence of the Recommended Clause after the Nine
Points Date.
Rows 8 to 14 present the same statistics with respect to Reviewed Agreements
to which Nine Points Signatories are parties, both before and after signing the Nine
Points document. Row 14 thus reveals the likely effect of the Nine Points document
on the licensing practices of Signatories. In contrast Rows 15 to 21 present these
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statistics with respect to Reviewed Agreements to which non-Signatories are
parties. Thus, Rows 17 and 19 enable comparison of the frequency of occurrence
of particular Recommended Clauses both before and after the Nine Points Date,
hopefully illuminating general trends in university licensing practices over the
period studied, independent of the Nine Points document (i.e., as a “control” set,
when compared to the results involving Signatories).
Row 22 shows the difference between the occurrence rate differences in Row
14 (Signatories) and Row 21 (non-Signatories). That is, the figures in Row 22 are
intended to compare changes in the rate of occurrence of particular Recommended
Clauses after Signatories have signed the Nine Points document with changes in
the rate of occurrence of those Recommended Clauses that may be attributable to
general industry trends following the Nine Points Date. In other words, Row 22
reveals the effect of the Nine Points document on the use of particular
Recommended Clauses when compared to general industry trends. Row 23, in
contrast, shows the absolute difference between the occurrence of a Recommended
Clause between Signatories and non-Signatories.
b. Point by Point Results
As shown in Table 2 and Figure 6, the occurrence of Recommended Clauses in
the Reviewed Agreements varies significantly. Below is a summary of the
frequencies at which each Recommended Clause occurred and how these
frequencies varied based on Nine Points signature status.
Point 1 – Reserved Rights. The Recommended Clauses contained within Point
1 appear frequently in the Reviewed Agreements. Recommended Clause 1.a, in
which a university retains the right to use an exclusively licensed technology for
educational purposes, appeared in 209 of 224 Reviewed Agreements (93% [row
2]). The rate of occurrence is even higher (96%) when the seven non-exclusive
agreements (as to which the clause is not relevant) are excluded.158 This high rate
of occurrence is comparable for both pre-Nine Points and post-Nine Points
agreements (93% [rows 4, 6]). The rate is also comparable between Signatories
and Non-Signatories to the Nine Points document. Clause 1.a appeared in 91% of
Reviewed Agreements to which Signatories were parties [row 9] (96% when nonexclusive licenses are excluded from the total) and 96% of Reviewed Agreements
to which non-Signatories were parties [row 16].
Recommended Clause 1.b (retained right for internal research purposes) also
had high rates of adoption both before and after the Nine Points agreement (85%,
rows 4, 6]). The rate of adoption of Recommended Clause 1.c (transfer of materials
to academic/nonprofit labs) was approximately half that of the other Recommended
158

There were two co-exclusive agreements in our sample. Neither included the recommended
Point 1 clauses. However, because such clauses are conceivably relevant in a co-exclusive (as
opposed to a non-exclusive) license, it is not appropriate to exclude co-exclusive licenses from this
count.
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Clauses under Point 1, at 41% pre-Nine Points [row 4] and 43% post-Nine Points
[row 6]. It should be noted that materials transfer is relevant primarily to
agreements in the biopharmaceutical sector, and less so in software, electronics and
other fields.159
Among Nine Points Signatories, the occurrence of all Point 1 Recommended
Clauses increased slightly following adoption of the Nine Points document (2%,
6% and 9%, respectively [row 14]). Among non-Signatories, occurrence of
Recommended Clauses 1.a and 1.b decreased slightly after the Nine Points Date,
while use of Recommended Clause 1.c increased by 6% [row 21]. All of these
changes are within the margin of error other than the 12% increase in the occurrence
of Clause 1.c among Signatories.
The only significant difference in occurrence rates for Point 1 Recommended
Clauses between Signatories and non-Signatories was in Clause 1.b, in which the
Signatory occurrence rate (90% [row 9]) is 15 points [row 23] higher than the nonSignatory occurrence rate (75% [row 16]). The occurrence of Clauses 1.a and 1.c
among Signatories each increased a net 3% after adoption of the Nine Points
document when compared to the slight decrease among non-Signatories [row 22],
which is within the margin of error. Only Clause 1.b shows comparative increased
occurrence among Signatories in excess of the margin of error (9% [row 22]).
Points 2 and 5 - Exclusivity. As discussed in Part II, we classified the twelve
different Recommended Clauses made under Points 2 and 5 into six categories.
(1) Milestone Penalties – The Recommended Clauses in category 2(1) impose
various penalties on exclusive licensees that do not meet certain commercialization
milestones. Such penalties occurred in 21% of the Reviewed Agreements [row 2]
at comparable rates pre- and post-Nine Points, and are generally associated with
higher-value agreements in the biotechnology field. Occurrence rates for
Signatories and non-Signatories were comparable (21% and 20%, respectively
[rows 9 and 16]). Signatories increased usage of Clause 2(1) by 6% following
execution of the Nine Points document [row 14], whereas usage among nonSignatories declined by 9% [row 21], resulting in a net increase among Signatories
versus industry trends of 15% [row 22].
(2) Public Health/Medical Use – The Recommended Clauses in category 2(2)
create exclusions from exclusivity for various public health and clinical uses. These
clauses occurred in only 3% of Reviewed Agreements [row 2].
(3) Limit Sale, But Not Use – Clause 2(3) grants the licensee exclusive rights
to sell a licensed product, but this exclusivity does not extend to use of the licensed
product. The clause occurred slightly more frequently among Signatories than nonSignatories (11% vs 8% [rows 9 and 16]), and saw a 12% increase among
Signatories following adoption of the Nine Points document [row 14], with no
159

CONTRERAS, LICENSING AND TRANSACTIONS, supra note x, at Ch. 14.E.
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meaningful change among non-Signatories [row 21]. This is one of the few
detectable, if small, effects that may be attributable to the Nine Points document.
(4) Research Tools – Point 2 urges universities to grant non-exclusive licenses
with respect to broadly applicable research tools. The contractual text associated
with this recommendation is the license grant itself, which may be exclusive or nonexclusive. There were only seven non-exclusive licenses in our sample. Because
our textual coding methodology was not suited to determine whether the rights
granted under any particular Reviewed Agreement related to a broadly applicable
research tool, it was not possible to determine how frequently research tools were
licensed on a non-exclusive basis.
(5) Education – Recommended Clause 2(5) excludes from exclusive license
grants the ability of third parties to use the licensed rights for educational purposes
(beyond the reservation for internal university educational purposes provided in
Recommended Clause 1.a). This clause appeared in 7% [row 2] of Reviewed
Agreements at comparable rates for Signatories and non-Signatories. There was no
discernable change in Signatory occurrences post-Nine Points [row 14], though the
rate of non-Signatory occurrences dropped by 8% [row 21].
(6) Quality Control - Recommended Clause 2(5) excludes from exclusive
license grants the ability of third parties to use the licensed rights for quality control
and verification purposes. This clause occurred in no Reviewed Agreements.
Point 3 – Improvements. The Recommended Clauses under Point 3 limit a
licensee’s rights in technology improvements made by the university. At least one
of these clauses appeared in 99% of Reviewed Agreements at comparable rates preand post-Nine Points and among Signatories and non-Signatories.
Point 5 – Research Tools. See Point 2 above.
Point 6 – Enforcement. Recommended Clause 6 requires exclusive licensees
to consult with or obtain the permission of the university prior to enforcing licensed
rights against a third party. This clause appeared in only 3% [row 2] of Reviewed
Agreements. However, a similar clause (not recommended by the Nine Points
document) that requires exclusive licensees only to notify the university prior to
enforcing the licensed rights against a third party occurred in 97% of Reviewed
Agreements at comparable rates pre- and post-Nine Points and among Signatories
and non-Signatories.
Point 7 – Export Controls. Recommended Clause 7 requires licensees to
comply with applicable export laws and regulations. This clause appeared in only
4% [row 2] of Reviewed Agreements.
Point 8 – Patent Assertion Entities. Recommended Clause 8 requires licensees
to operate under a business model that encourages commercialization and does not
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rely primarily on threats of infringement litigation to generate revenue. This clause
occurred in no Reviewed Agreements.
Point 9 – Access to Medicines. Recommended Clause 9 ensures that
underprivileged populations have low- or no-cost access to adequate quantities of
licensed medical innovations. This clause occurred in no Reviewed Agreements.

C.

Subsequent University Licensing Trends

The Nine Points document, which was widely discussed, focused attention on
the public aspects of university licensing activities. As such, it both attracted
endorsements by national groups and prompted further action by some universities.
This Part III.C summarizes some of the major trends in university technology
transfer following the release of the Nine Points document.
1. External Endorsements of the Nine Points Document
In 2011, a committee of the National Research Council of the National
Academies undertook a formal study of “the organization, functioning, and effects
of university technology transfer activities involving formal intellectual property
rights.”160 The committee, which included at least two participants from the 2006
Stanford meeting,161 made a number of findings and recommendations, among
which was an endorsement of the Nine Points document and a set of nine
recommendations that closely track the Nine Points.162
In 2014 and 2015, each of the Association of American Universities (AAU) and
the Association of Public & Land-Grant Universities (APLU), respectively, formed
a committee to examine issues surrounding the management of university
technology in the public interest. In a three-page statement, the AAU’s committee
encouraged member institutions to “[r]eaffirm or affirm the university’s
commitment to adhering to technology transfer practices that best serve the public
interest and which are guided by principles such as those outlined in the Nine Points
document.”163 The APLU, in a seven-page statement, recommended that its
members “review and support to the extent practical the [Nine Points document]
and align IP management policies and practices with the Nine Points.”164

160

NRC University Report, supra note 14.
David Korn (Harvard) and Katherine Ku (Stanford). See NRC University Report, supra note 14,
at vi.
162
See NRC University Report, supra note 14, at 6-7.
163
AAU Statement, supra note 15, at 3.
164
APLU Task Force on Managing University Intellectual Property, Statement to APLU Members
of Recommendations on Managing University Intellectual Property, Mar. 2015, at 2.
161
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2. Socially Responsible Licensing
Following the release of the Nine Points document, several universities,
encouraged by a range of constituents including the student group UAEM,165
continued to refine and expand their positions regarding the licensing of healthrelated technologies in the developing world. This effort led to the release in
November 2009 of a new document titled Statement of Principles and Strategies
for the Equitable Dissemination of Medical Technologies, which was endorsed by
two original Nine Points Signatories (Yale and Harvard), three later Nine Points
Signatories (Boston University, Oregon Health & Science University and
University of Pennsylvania), one non-Signatory (Brown University) and AUTM.166
The goal of the 2009 Statement was to provide “a more concrete statement of goals
as well as licensing practices [to] help to promote further progress in advancing
health in developing countries.”167
The 2009 Statement is four pages in length and articulates seven principles and
strategies for the management and licensing of medical innovations so as to
increase dissemination of these innovations to needy populations. These include
both high-level aspirational goals, such as “appris[ing] potential commercial
partners of our institutions’ commitment to contribute to the health and well-being
of populations throughout the developing world”,168 as well as recommended
contractual clauses, such as “[r]eserved or ‘march-in’ rights, mandatory sublicenses
or non-assert provisions … [t]iered- or other appropriate pricing on a humanitarian
basis (e.g., subsidized, at-cost or no-cost)”,169 some of which echo those of the Nine
Points document, and others that go beyond it. Though the study described in this
article did not focus on the particular contractual clauses recommended by the 2009
Statement, our coding of Reviewed Agreements for clauses responsive to Point 9
and other provisions of the Nine Points document would likely cover many of the
recommendations of the 2009 Statement.
The 2009 Statement also included a number of ongoing evaluative, reporting
and evolutionary commitments. For example, the Statement provides that the
signatories will “develop and apply meaningful metrics to evaluate the success of
… efforts to facilitate global access”, “cooperate in the creation of [a] compendium
of best practices, tools and techniques; and [a] consistent means of reporting on our
global access initiatives and activities” and “[r]evisit these principles on a biennial
basis, to ensure that they reflect currently-understood best practices.”170 We are not
aware of publicly available information indicating that these ongoing commitments
have been followed in a systematic or collective manner, though individual
165

Six Universities Adopt New Technology Transfer Principles Designed to Speed Access to
Affordable Medicines in the Developing World, YaleNews, Nov. 9, 2009.
166
Statement of Principles and Strategies for the Equitable Dissemination of Medical Technologies
(2009) [hereinafter 2009 Statement].
167
2009 Statement, supra note 166, at 1.
168
2009 Statement, supra note 166, at 2.
169
2009 Statement, supra note 166, at 3.
170
2009 Statement, supra note 166, at 4.
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universities may have sought to address one or more of these commitments
individually.171
Interestingly, University of California Berkeley, which was an early leader in
socially responsible licensing (see Part I.C.4), did not sign the 2009 Statement. It
did, however, continue to pursue humanitarian licensing opportunities, particularly
in the area of global health, through its own SRLP in the years following adoption
of the Nine Points document.172 Other universities also adopted socially responsible
licensing programs following the adoption of the Nine Points document. One study
conducted in 2015 reported the results of interviews with representatives of eleven
Canadian, European and U.S. universities, including several Nine Points and 2009
Statement signatories, each of which had a more or less formal socially responsible
licensing policy.173
The development of the groundbreaking CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing technology
by researchers at Berkeley and the Broad Institute of Harvard and MIT, among
others, led to renewed interest in the humanitarian applications of university
technology. As noted above, Berkeley and Broad were criticized for granting
broad, exclusive licenses of their CRISPR technology to privately held “surrogate”
companies unbounded by the public missions of the universities.174 At the same
time, the Broad Institute, at least, evidenced a desire to exclude the most
controversial agricultural uses of its technology – the creation of sterile ‘terminator’
seeds, the development of species-destroying gene drives, and the
commercialization of tobacco products -- from the licenses that it granted.175 This
form of public-minded exclusion has been termed “ethical licensing”.176
The Covid-19 pandemic also prompted some universities to liberalize their
licensing programs with respect to Covid-related technologies. On April 7, 2020,
Harvard, MIT and Stanford announced a “COVID-19 Technology Access
Framework” that reflects the sentiments of Point 9 of the Nine Points document.177
171

See, e.g., Tania M. Bubela & Timothy Caulfield, Role and reality: technology transfer at
Canadian universities, 28 TRENDS IN BIOTECH. 447 (2010) (discussing non-financial metrics used
to assess TTO at one Canadian university).
172
See, e.g., Carol Mimura, Julie Cheng, & Braden Penhoet, Socially Responsible Licensing,
Euclidean Innovation, and the Valley of Death, STAN. J. L. SCI. & POLICY, Sept. 2011; Carol
Mimura, Nuanced Management of IP Rights: Shaping Industry-University Relationships to Promote
Social Impact, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Rochelle
Dreyfuss, Harry First, Diane Zimmerman, eds., 2010).
173
Nguyen, et al. supra note 25.
174
See Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 22.
175
See Christi J. Guerrini et al., The rise of the ethical license, 35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 22
(2017).
176
Id.
177
COVID-19 Technology Access Framework, STAN. OFF. TECH. LICENSING,
https://otl.stanford.edu/covid-19-technology-access-framework (visited Feb. 17, 2021) (“We are
committed to implementing COVID-19 patenting and licensing strategies that are consistent with
our goal of facilitating rapid global access. For most types of technologies, this includes the use of
rapidly executable non-exclusive royalty-free licenses to intellectual property rights that we have
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As of October 2021, twenty additional U.S. research institutions and one non-U.S.
university had also adopted this commitment.178 The licenses to be granted under
the Framework are both non-exclusive and royalty-free, designed to ensure broad
access. It is unclear how many, and to whom, licenses have been granted under this
framework, and with respect to what intellectual property.
Also in April 2020, AUTM released a set of COVID-19 Technology Licensing
Guidelines.179 These encourage intellectual property owners “to adopt a COVID19 licensing strategy that facilitates rapid pandemic response by licensees and to
make the execution of associated transactions a top priority.” The Guidelines then
suggest that “where legally possible, this strategy is best accomplished by adopting
time-limited, non-exclusive royalty-free licenses, in exchange for the licensees’
commitment to rapidly make and broadly distribute products and services to
prevent, diagnose, treat and contain COVID-19 and protect healthcare workers
during the pandemic.” As of October 2021, nearly one hundred institutions had
adopted these Guidelines, though it is not clear from publicly-available information
whether, and to what degree, such commitments led to any particular licensing
agreements.

3. Universities and Patent Assertion
Points 6 and 8 of the Nine Points document urge universities to be cautious
about engaging in patent enforcement litigation and licensing patents to third parties
that are likely to focus on patent enforcement and litigation (i.e., PAEs). But, as
noted in Part III.B.3, we observed no incorporation of these Recommended Clauses
into university licensing agreements.
Notwithstanding the Nine Points recommendations, the enforcement of patents
by U.S. universities has continued to attract attention with high-profile lawsuits and
enormous damages awards. In 2008, WARF began to assert one of its patents
covering computer processors against chip manufacturers.180 It achieved an early
$110 million settlement with Intel, then an attention-grabbing damage award of
$506 million against Apple.181 The case prompted numerous outlets again to ask
whether WARF is, indeed, a patent troll.182 But WARF is not alone. In 2020,

the right to license, for the purpose of making and distributing products to prevent, diagnose and
treat COVID-19 infection during the pandemic and for a short period thereafter.”)
178
The same number of universities appeared in January 2021, suggesting that adoption of the
Framework has more or less ceased.
179
Assn. Univ. Tech. Managers, https://autm.net/about-tech-transfer/covid19/covid-19-licensingguidelines
180
See Valdivia, supra note 130.
181
Wisconsin Alum. Res. Fndn. v. Apple, Inc., Case No. l 4-cv-062-wmc (W.D. Wis., Jul. 25, 2017).
182
See, e.g., Is WARF trolling Apple?, UIC REV. INTELL. PROP. L., Oct. 24, 2015,
https://ripl.law.uic.edu/news-stories/is-warf-trolling-apple/; Laurel White, 'Is WARF a patent troll?'
and four other questions about the Apple vs. WARF lawsuit, answered, CAPITAL TIMES, Oct. 15,
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CalTech won a $1.1 billion award against Apple and Broadcom for Wi-Fi related
patents,183 and recently asserted the same patent against Samsung.184
Recent literature suggests that university-initiated patent litigation has
increased since the adoption of the Nine Points document.185 In a 2011 study,
Professor Jacob Rooksby found that during 2009 and 2010 alone, thirty-three
different universities had initiated patent infringement lawsuits.186 In a 2020 study,
Professors Teo Firpo and Michael Mireles found that, between 2000 and 2014,
Boston University and CalTech, both Nine Points Signatories, initiated around forty
patent infringement suits each, and that, in general, such suits are on the rise.187
Professors Firpo and Mireles suggest at least three different reasons that universityinitiated patent litigation may further increase in the future: “[First,] some
universities have begun to change their tenure policies to include consideration of
commercialization activities performed by professors. Second, most TTOs have not
been able to generate enough revenue to cover their own costs. Third, the federal
government has been reducing funding for research.”188
With respect to the relationship between universities and PAEs, several postNine Points studies have identified significant trafficking of patents between
universities and PAEs. In 2012, Thomas Ewing and Professor Robin Feldman
identified forty different universities (including six signatories of the Nine Points
document) that had licensed or transferred patents to Intellectual Ventures, a large
PAE, or one of its holding companies.189 Two more recent studies observe
significant rates of patent sales by universities to PAEs.190 This trend has caused
2015, https://madison.com/ct/news/local/writers/laurel-white/is-warf-a-patent-troll-and-four-otherquestions-about-the-apple-vs-warf-lawsuit/article_4179a7c6-2c8f-55ed-ac13-6e8abe301519.html.
183
See Susan Decker, Ian Lopez & Matthew Bultman, Caltech wins a $1.1-billion patent verdict
against Apple and Broadcom, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 30, 2020.
184
See Andrew Karpan, Caltech Sues Samsung After $1B Apple Patent Win, LAW360, Dec. 3, 2021.
185
See, e.g., Teo Firpo & Michael S. Mireles, Currents and Crosscurrents in litigation of University
and Nonproft Related Patents: Is there a coming wave of patent litigation involving those patents?
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 309, 309 n.1
(Jacob H. Rooksby ed., 2020) (collecting academic literature); Stan Gibson, A Snapshot of
University
Patent
Litigation,
PATENT
LAWYER
BLOG,
Dec.
11,
2015,
https://patentlaw.jmbm.com/2015/12/a-snapshot-of-university-paten.html; Andrew Chung, Schools
that sue: Why more universities file patent lawsuits, REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2015,
https://www.reuters.com/article/university-patents/schools-that-sue-why-more-universities-filepatent-lawsuits-idUSL1N11G2C820150915.
186
Jacob H. Rooksby, University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation, 10 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 660 (2011).
187
Firpo & Mireles, supra note 185, at 316-17.
188
Firpo & Mireles, supra note 185, at 318.
189
Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012). See
also Heidi Ledford, Universities struggle to make patents pay, 501 NATURE 471 (2013) (describing
CalTech’s exclusive license of fifty patents to Intellectual Ventures).
190
See Brian J. Love, Erik Oliver & Michael Costa, U.S. Patent Sales by Universities and Research
Institutions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
256, 266 (Jacob H. Rooksby ed., 2020) (“the vast majority of acquisitions [of patents from
universities] appear to have been made with patent assertion in mind”); Stefanie Fusco et al.,
Monetization Strategies of University Patents through PAEs: an Analysis of US Patent Transfers,
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AUTM to reconsider its position on universities transferring patents to PAEs
notwithstanding the guidance contained in the Nine Points document.191
Most recently, in January 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a
favorable business review letter to a group of fifteen U.S. universities, including
ten signatories of the Nine Points document, that proposed a new patent pool.192
The pool, known as the University Technology Licensing Program (UTLP), would
aggregate university-held patents covering physical science inventions, initially
those relating to autonomous vehicles, the Internet of things, and big data.193 The
UTLP has been criticized by observers including the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, which fears that the new pool will seek to license and assert patents of
low quality in a manner that “sounds an awful lot like a patent troll.”194
4. Export Controls
Point 7 of the Nine Points document encourages universities to be vigilant about
U.S. export control regulations. Issues relating to the export of technical and
scientific know-how in violation of U.S. law have increased dramatically since the
Nine Points document was signed in 2007. Beginning in 2016, the U.S. government
has added numerous Chinese universities to its list of restricted entities to which
sensitive information cannot be disclosed.195 In 2020, the chair of Harvard’s
chemistry department was charged with concealing the receipt of millions of dollars
from the Chinese government and a Boston University researcher was indicted for
2019 ISSI Conference Proceedings (2019) (identifying 326 patents transferred by universities to
PAEs during preceding ten years).
191
See Paul Basken, Under Financial Pressure, Universities Give Patent Buyers a Closer Look,
CHRON. HIGHER ED., Oct. 25, 2013 (quoting AUTM’s President).
192
Letter from Michael F. Murray, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept.
Justice Antitrust Division, to Garrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell, dated Jan. 23, 2021
[hereinafter UTLP Review Letter]. The requesting universities include Brown; Caltech; Columbia;
Cornell; Harvard, Northwestern; Princeton; State University of New York at Binghamton;
University of California, Berkeley; University of California, Los Angeles; University of Illinois;
University of Michigan; University of Pennsylvania; University of Southern California; and Yale.
Id.
193
Letter from Garrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell, to Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, dated Aug. 14, 2020 at 2 [hereinafter UTLP
Request Letter].
194
Joe Mullin, 15 Universities Have Formed a Company That Looks a Lot Like a Patent Troll, Jun.
10, 2020, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/06/15-universities-have-formed-company-looks-lotpatent-troll (accessed Oct. 1, 2021) (“Imagine this: a limited liability company (LLC) is formed, for
the sole purpose of acquiring patents, including what are likely to be low-quality patents of suspect
validity. Patents in hand, the LLC starts approaching high-tech companies and demanding licensing
fees. If they don’t get paid, the company will use contingency-fee lawyers and a litigation finance
firm to make sure the licensing campaign doesn’t have much in the way of up-front costs. This helps
give them leverage to extract settlements from companies that don’t want to pay to defend the matter
in court, even if a court might ultimately invalidate the patent if it reached the issue. That sounds an
awful lot like a patent troll ... Unfortunately, this description also applies to a company that has just
been formed by a consortium of 15 large research universities.”).
195
Yojana Sharma, US export controls raise research collaboration concerns, UNIVERSITY WORLD
NEWS, Jun. 25, 2019.
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failing to disclose on a visa application that she was a lieutenant in the Chinese
army.196 In 2021, an Ohio State University professor was sentenced to 37 months
in prison for making false statements to federal authorities about his research on
behalf of the Chinese government.197 These highly-publicized incidents confirm
that export control issues remain important to universities.
IV. LICENSING IN THE SHADOW OF THE NINE POINTS
This Part IV addresses the implications of the findings presented in Part III.B,
above, beginning with observations about the adoption of the Nine Points document
itself and continuing with the use (or non-use) of particular Recommended Clauses
in university licensing agreements.
A. Adoption and Non-Adoption of the Nine Points Document
As discussed in Part III.B.1 above, the Nine Points document saw an initial
period of high rates of adoption, followed by a steep decline. This pattern is not
uncommon among public interest intellectual property projects.198 The high levels
of uptake during the initial period suggest an institutional desire to be part of a
group that is attracting positive public reactions. By the same token, declining
adoption after the initial surge suggests decreased promotion of the project by its
creators, the emergence of more desirable, competing alternatives, and a
recognition that declining to accede resulted in few negative consequences for
holdouts.199 One example of such a holdout is Columbia University, the only
participant at the 2006 Stanford meeting that did not sign the Nine Points document.
Columbia, with 2020 gross licensing income of nearly $45 million, and a total
research budget of approximately one billion dollars, seems to have suffered little
from its refusal to accede to the Nine Points document.
As shown in Table 3, other significant holdouts from the Nine Points document
include some of the largest universities and medical research centers in the United
States.

196

See Kate O’Keeffe & Aruna Viswanatha, Chinese Military Turns to U.S. University to Conduct
Covert Research, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2020.
197
U.S. Dept. Justice, University Researcher Sentenced to Prison for Lying on Grant Applications
to Develop Scientific Expertise for China, May 14, 2021.
198
See, e.g., Contreras, Open COVID, supra note 21, at *69 (discussing Open COVID Pledge and
“initial burst of interest, followed by a steady decline in new pledge commitments”); Jorge L.
Contreras, Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, Pledging Patents for the Public Good: Rise and
Fall of the Eco-Patent Commons, 57 HOUSTON L. REV. 61, 73-76 (2019) (group formed in 2008
gained strong initial support, with modest increases through 2011, after which no new members
joined, and was discontinued in 2016).
199
See Contreras, Open COVID, supra note 21, at *69 (“entities that adopted a ‘wait and see’
approach to the Pledge may have concluded, following its debut, that the benefits enjoyed by early
adopters were not as significant as originally anticipated, and that negative effects from not joining
did not materialize. As such, for these entities, the cost-benefit balance might continue to weigh in
favor of not making the Pledge”).
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Table 3
Top 25 U.S. Academic Institutions by 2020 Gross Licensing Income and
Signature Status
Institution
University of Texas System
Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Ctr.
City of Hope Natl. Med. Ctr.
Massachusetts General Hospital
Princeton University
Mayo Foundation/Clinic
Stanford University
University of California System
Northwestern University
Massachusetts Inst. Tech.
Mount Sinai School of Medicine
Duke University
University of Houston
University of Florida
Harvard University
Rockefeller University
University of Illinois Chicago/Urbana Champaign
Baylor College of Medicine
University of New Mexico
Columbia University
Brigham & Women’s Hospital
University of Pennsylvania
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
Johns Hopkins University
University of Washington

2020 Gross Licensing Income200
$362,712,828
$265,284,478
$165,523,000
$142,906,417
$134,338,003
$117,885,888
$114,022,678
$107,945,000
$105,321,475
$87,000,000
$77,120,430
$65,267,643
$59,116,380
$58,695546
$58,687,376
$57,512,998
$54,232,350
$53,123,532
$52,341,706
$43,517,319
$31,145,259
$30,617,752
$30,200,000
$27,395,520
$27,364,553

Green = Signatory
Rose = Non-Signatory
Yet even with the significant holdouts shown in Table 3, the adoption rate of
the Nine Points document is impressive. AUTM reports technology transfer
statistics for 183 U.S. academic institutions.201 The 75 U.S. academic institutions
that are Nine Points Signatories represent 41% of this total, a far greater portion
than most other public interest patent-related projects. By way of comparison, the
2009 Statement on socially responsible licensing attracted twenty-one signatories,
the Eco-Patent Commons, a coalition of companies that committed not to assert
patents against green/clean technologies, attracted only thirteen large industrial
firms,202 a tiny fraction of the total world industrial base, and the Open COVID
Pledge, a similar commitment with respect to technologies relevant to COVID-19,
attracted 32 patent holders.203 Even the Harvard-MIT-Stanford COVID-19
200

AUTM 2020 Survey, supra note 1.
AUTM 2020 Survey, supra note 1.
202
Contreras et al., Eco-Patent, supra note 198, at 73-76.
203
Contreras, Open COVID, supra note 21, at *68.
201
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Technology Access Framework, aimed specifically at research universities, has
attracted only twenty-four signatories since its inception in April 2020.204
It is possible, of course, that the adoption rate for the Nine Points document is
higher than rates for these other programs because its requirements are more
modest. The Eco-Patent Commons, Open COVID Pledge and COVID-19
Technology Access Framework each requires its participants to commit to make
patents available for specified purposes at no charge. This goes far beyond the
requirements of the Nine Points document, which merely suggests amendments to
contractual language, most of which are beneficial to academic licensors.

B.

The Question of Benefit

When analyzing the Nine Points document, it is useful to recognize that the
Nine Points are themselves heterogeneous. Though the Nine Points document is
framed in terms of the “public interest”, several of its Recommended Clauses
largely benefit university licensors. For example, Clauses 1.a and 1.b can be
included in an exclusive licensing agreement to preserve a university’s right to
conduct internal research and educational activities. While there may be some
public benefit arising from allowing such research and educational activities to
continue, the primary and most direct beneficiary of such clauses appears to be the
university itself. Likewise, the clauses in category 2(1) give the university
flexibility to replace an underperforming exclusive licensee, thereby enhancing the
university’s revenue and dissemination of the licensed technology. While the
public might be an indirect beneficiary of broader availability of a licensed
technology, the university appears to be the primary beneficiary of such rights.
Point 5, on the other hand, encourages universities to refrain from granting
exclusive rights with respect to broadly applicable research tools. Because
exclusive licenses are generally more lucrative than non-exclusive licenses, this
recommendation could tend to reduce university revenue in favor of serving the
public interest in broad availability of research tools. Likewise, Point 9, relating to
increasing the availability of health-related technologies for underserved
populations, has the public interest as its primary focus, with associated goodwill
and reputational benefits to the university playing a secondary role.
There are, of course, gray areas. For example, Point 4, which counsels
universities to be vigilant as to conflicts of interest, benefits the university by
helping it to steer clear of embarrassing or compromising conflict situations. By

204

Stanford Univ., Harvard Univ. Mass. Inst. Tech., COVID-19 Technology Access Framework,
https://otl.stanford.edu/covid-19-technology-access-framework (visited Sept. 18, 2021). See also
Contreras, Open COVID, supra note 21, at *73-74 (discussing low uptake of Harvard-MIT-Stanford
framework). Notably, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, a major holdout from the Nine
Points document (see Table 1), has adopted the COVID-19 Technology Access Framework.

48

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3990450

CONTRERAS

NINE POINTS

Draft 21 Dec. 21

the same token, the public also stands to benefit from a reduction in conflicts of
interest among university personnel and university licensees.
Nevertheless, at a high level, it is possible to estimate, for each Recommended
Clause, whether it principally benefits the university through reduced risk,
increased flexibility, or higher revenue, or whether it principally benefits the public
through broader access to technology or lower costs, usually at some direct cost or
foregone opportunity to the university. Table 4 offers an assessment of the primary
beneficiary of each of the Nine Points Recommended Clauses.
Table 4
Primary Beneficiaries of the Nine Points Recommended Clauses
Point
1.a
1.b
1.c
2(1)
2(2)
2(3)
2(4)
2(5)
2(6)
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Description
University reserved right for education
University reserved right for research
University right to transfer materials
Milestone penalties
Public health/medical use
Exclusive sale but not use
Research tool non-exclusivity
Third party education and training
Quality control
Licensing of future improvements
Conflicts of interest
Broad access to research tools
Consent to enforcement
Export regulations
Working with patent aggregators
Availability of medical innovations

Primary beneficiary
university
university
university
university
public
public
public
university
public
university
university
public
public
university
public
public

As shown in Table 4, clauses primarily benefitting universities and the public
are evenly split in the Nine Points document, with eight groups of clauses in each
such category. This breakdown is graphically illustrated in Figure 7, which
overlays the classification of clauses as benefitting universities or the public against
the frequency with which such clauses occurred among the Reviewed Agreements.
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Figure 7

C.

Occurrence of Recommended Clauses

With the above dichotomy between university-benefitting clauses and publicbenefitting clauses in mind, it is possible to draw make general observations about
the occurrence of the Recommended Clauses in university licensing agreements.
a. Correlation with University Benefit
As suggested by Figure 7, university licenses are most likely to include
Recommended Clauses that benefit the university and less likely to include
Recommended Clauses that benefit the public. That is, those Recommended
Clauses with the highest incidence benefit the university, while those with the
lowest incidence benefit the public. It is not difficult to understand this result. Like
all negotiating parties, universities draft licensing agreements to benefit
themselves. Clauses that may benefit the public at some cost to the university
appear to be less desirable and are thus far less frequent.
Only two university-favorable clauses had low occurrence rates. These were
Clause 2(5), which excludes from a licensee’s exclusivity the university’s right to
license others to use the licensed rights for educational purposes, and Clause 7,
which requires a licensee to comply with applicable export regulations. One reason
that Clause 2(5) may occur infrequently is that there is a low perceived need for it.
50
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Clause 1.a, with the highest overall occurrence rate, already permits a university to
use an exclusively licensed technology for its own educational purposes, a right
that appears to be important to most universities. But authorizing a third party to
conduct educational activities may be a less common requirement, and may also be
more objectionable to potential licensees.
Clause 7, on the other hand, is a legally superfluous clause. It merely requires
that a licensee comply with applicable export laws and regulations, a requirement
that already exists by virtue of law whether or not required by agreement. Such
“compliance with law” clauses are not uncommon in legal agreements, but their
purpose is to create a breach of agreement if one party violates an applicable law,
rather than to prescribe a party’s conduct in any particular way.205
The foregoing calculus equates benefit with financial gain. Other constructions
of benefit are, of course, possible. For example, Dr. Momura explains that in
Berkeley’s SRLP, “social impact is valued as strongly as other outcomes such as
licensing revenue.”206 Other university benefits such as reputation, student morale,
alumni relations, government relations and donor development may also be
balanced against direct financial gain from licensing agreements. Yet these
considerations do not appear to have had much impact on the occurrence of
Recommended Clauses, even in licensing agreements to which the University of
California is a party (see Table 5).
Table 5
University of California versus Overall Occurrences
Point
1.a
1.b
1.c
2(1)
2(2)
2(3)
2(5)
2(6)
3
6
7
8
9

Description

Primary
beneficiary

University reserved right for education
University reserved right for research
University right to transfer materials
Milestone penalties
Public health/medical use
Exclusive sale but not use
Third party education and training
Quality control
Licensing of future improvements
Consent to enforcement
Export regulations
Working with patent aggregators
Availability of medical innovations

university
university
university
university
public
public
university
public
university
public
university
public
public

Total
Frequency
(n=224)
93%
85%
42%
21%
3%
10%
7%
0%
99%
3%
4%
0%
0%

205

UC
Frequency
(n=16)
94%
100%
69%
13%
0%
13%
6%
0%
94%
0%
0%
0%
0%

See CONTRERAS, LICENSING AND TRANSACTIONS, supra note 65, at 361 (“While a contractual
commitment such as the one above does not make compliance with applicable laws any more or
less mandatory, it does establish that a party that fails to comply with applicable laws can be found
to be in breach of contract, in addition to any liability that the non-complying party may have to
regulatory or enforcement authorities.”)
206
Momura, supra note x, at 17.
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b. Minimal Effect on Agreement Text
In most cases, the creation and signature of the Nine Points document had little
or no measurable impact on the text of university licensing agreements with either
Signatories or non-Signatories. That is, for both frequent and infrequent
Recommended Clauses, occurrence rates were comparable both pre- and post-Nine
Points. Additionally, as illustrated by the example of University of California
(Table 6), there were no discernable patterns in the occurrence of Recommended
Clauses even among agreements signed by the same university licensor (i.e., the
sixteen universities that were parties to five or more Reviewed Agreements),
whether that university was a Signatory or a non-Signatory. These observations
suggest that university TTO officers drafting and negotiating licensing agreements
did not overhaul or add particular clauses to their licensing agreements in response
to the adoption of the Nine Points document.207 In large part, they continued doing
what they were already doing.
This observation runs counter to various statements made by TTO officials
when commenting on the Nine Points document and similar policy statements. For
example, Nguyen et al. interviewed TTO officials at several universities and were
told that once they created socially responsible licensing programs, contractual
terms promoting socially responsible licensing practices were regularly
incorporated into licensing agreements.208
D.

Discussion and Analysis

Given the prominence of the Nine Points document and its broad adoption by
the academic community, it is worth considering why its Recommended Clauses
were adopted so infrequently in university licensing agreements and the other
trends observed in university technology transfer have continued notwithstanding
the aspirational statements in the Nine Points document.

207

One minor exception may be Clause 2(3), the “exclusive sale but not use” limitation, the
occurrence rate of which increased slightly (12%) among Signatories after the signing of the Nine
Points document, with no corresponding increase among non-Signatories. This is the only
Recommended Clause, the occurrence of which increased meaningfully following signature of the
Nine Points document. There are several possible explanations for this modest increase in usage.
First, the clause is somewhat innovative. It seeks to achieve a public-oriented goal through a subtle
adjustment of the scope of the license grant. By eliminating the licensee’s exclusivity on the use of
a patented technique, the lack of exclusivity enables others to utilize that technique, either by
creating their own process or using one obtained from an unlicensed source. At the same time, it
ensures that the only authorized vendor of, say, test kits embodying the invention, is the licensee.
Such a clause would generally be undesirable for commercial licensees, so a university’s inclusion
of the clause would work against its own financial interest. Thus, while the rate of occurrence of
Clause 2(3) increased among Signatories following their signing the Nine Points document, the
overall rate of occurrence [19%] remains modest.
208
See Nguyen, et al. supra note 25, at 193, Table 2 (statements by Harvard and Yale
representatives).
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1. Alternative Routes to Achieving Nine Points Goals
The absence of the Nine Points Recommended Clauses in university licensing
agreements need not suggest a disregard for the principles espoused in the Nine
Points document. Rather, it is possible that universities have incorporated into their
licensing agreements clauses directed toward the various issues raised by the Nine
Points document, but which differ from the Recommended Clauses. That is, the
Recommended Clauses are specific clauses that can accomplish particular goals
within a licensing agreement, but those goals may also be accomplished by other
means that are less amenable to standardization in a general document such as the
Nine Points document. For example, in order to achieve the goals articulated in
Point 9 relating to access to health-related technologies in the developing world,
royalty rates may be structured to favor distribution of licensed products in lowincome countries.209 Milestone obligations may include regulatory approval for
distribution of products in such countries or the actual distribution thereof. A
licensee’s territory may be limited to exclude low-income countries so that they
may be supplied by an alternate vendor. We did not attempt to review the entirety
of the Reviewed Agreements for all possible language addressing particular issues
of concern to universities. Instead, we only determined whether the Reviewed
Agreements incorporated the Recommended Clauses suggested by the Nine Points
document. Thus, our results do not reflect these alternative approaches to achieving
the goals of the Nine Points document.
Moreover, some public goals may be achieved through discretionary
mechanisms that are not hard-wired into an agreement’s text. For example, many
university licensing agreements permit the licensor (i.e., the university) to select, in
its sole discretion, the countries in which to seek patent protection for a particular
technology. If it wishes to improve access to medical technologies in low-income
countries, the university could simply elect not to seek protection in those countries,
notwithstanding its licensee’s wishes.210
Another non-textual mechanism available to university licensors is the selection
of licensees at the outset. For example, a university could elect to grant a license
to a manufacturer based in a developing country rather than an established global
enterprise. Or, rather than including a prohibition on a licensee’s pursuit of a patent
monetization business model – the wholly unrealistic recommendation of Point 8 a university could choose not to license its intellectual property to entities known
to be PAEs.
209

See, e.g., Nguyen, et al. supra note 25, at 194.
This approach was advocated by the 2009 Statement, supra note x, at 2 (“Early publication and
wide dissemination of results will be encouraged to reduce opportunities for interfering patents”)
and some universities, Nguyen, et al. supra note 25, at 196, Table 8 (statements by Harvard, Oxford,
Yale). This being said, university decisions not to seek patent protection in certain countries would
have only a limited impact on the patent coverage of most drugs, which are also covered by patents
held by private firms. See Maya Durvasula, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Heidi Williams, Private and
Public Investments in Biomedical Research, 111 AEA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 341, 344 n.12
(2021).
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Likewise, a university has the flexibility at the outset to decide whether it
wishes to grant licenses on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis. The use of nonexclusive licensing for broadly applicable research tools is recommended both by
the Nine Points document and NIH Guidelines, but, as discussed in Part III.B.3,
above, it is difficult to measure the degree to which this mechanism is used in
practice.
Finally, even if a university wishes to incorporate a Recommended Clause in a
licensing agreement, there is no assurance that the licensee will agree to do so.
While most university licensing agreements are initially drafted by university
counsel, many are negotiated, some heavily. During negotiation, each party must
assess and weigh the importance of each clause to which the other party objects and
determine when to take a stand and when to concede. Though universities
undeniably have some bargaining leverage in licensing negotiations, the large
companies with which they negotiate often have the ability to fund university
research programs for years to come. Universities must thus be sensitive to
negotiating “too hard” and thus losing deals that might provide overall benefits for
the institution.
For all of these reasons, the presence or absence of particular Nine Points
Recommended Clauses may not tell the entire story with respect to the goals or
practices of any particular university in any given situation. While one might
interpret the findings presented above as suggesting that universities act in a largely
self-interested manner, adopting licensing provisions that benefit them and doing
little to adopt provisions intended to benefit the public, this may not always be the
case.
2. Commercialism and TTOs
While university research officials espouse the public interest missions of their
institutions, TTO personnel may have a more directed focus on maximizing
university licensing income. This focus is reinforced by the annual AUTM
Licensing Activity Survey, which ranks TTOs on the basis of licensing income,
startup formation, agreement completion and other numerical factors.211 Such
rankings serve to highlight commercial TTO accomplishments to the exclusion of
more public-oriented goals.
Moreover, a small but growing number of universities have implemented
incentive compensation schemes to reward TTO personnel based on the
achievement of metrics such as the number of license agreements completed,
license income and startup company formation.212 To the extent that TTO personnel
211

See AUTM 2020 Survey, supra note 1.
Assn. Univ. Tech. Managers, 2017 AUTM Salary Survey 85 (2018) (39 of 172 responding
institutions reported having an incentive compensation scheme, representing an increase of 33%
over the prior biennial survey).
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are personally remunerated for revenue-based achievements, then it is no surprise
that revenue generation has become a primary goal of some TTOs.213
Underscoring this point, a cursory review of recent training programs offered
to university TTO personnel reveals an emphasis on sales and marketing skills.
Below are a few examples of promotional materials targeted at TTO personnel
indicating the types of skills that they should seek to gain:
Though marketing expertise is sorely lacking at most TTOs,
the good news is that marketing skills can be taught,
practiced, and perfected. By making a small investment in
these skill sets your TTO will reap huge dividends in its
ability to tell a compelling story about your innovations and
attract the licensees, investors, entrepreneurs, and partners
you need.214
Keen attention to detail can prepare you for more successful
royalty audits … [A] well-run royalty audit can potentially
add hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue to your
bottom line.215
Get the tools and guidance you need to successfully value,
price, and negotiate technology licenses:
• Get detailed explanations of royalty rate derivation
models
• Optimize the pricing of your IP
• Negotiate lucrative licensing deals
• Support infringement damages216
Interestingly, even the federal government appears to have embraced this
commercial approach to university licensing. One recent seminar for TTO
personnel was titled “Marketing University Innovations: Strategies to Revitalize
and Expand a High-Touch, Low-Tech Approach that Gets Results” and was led by
a Senior Technology Transfer Manager from the National Cancer Institute.217
213

See, e.g., Tech Transfer Central, Non-Monetary Metrics that Every TTO Should be Tracking:
Measuring Your Collaborative Culture (promotional email received by the author on Nov. 9, 2021
– on file with author) (“[university] administrators are increasingly looking for a bottom line return
-- courtesy of the TTO -- to shore up lost research dollars and continue fueling the commercialization
pipeline”).
214
Tech Transfer Central, Marketing Boot Camp for university TTOs -- on-demand and share-able
so you can build skills amongst your entire staff (promotional email received by the author on Dec.
6, 2021 – on file with author).
215
Tech
Transfer
Central,
Technology
Transfer
Tactics,
September
2021,
https://techtransfercentral.com/category/technology-transfer-tactics/.
216
Tech Transfer Central, A how-to guide to calculating royalty rates in technology licensing
(promotional email received by the author on Dec. 2, 2021 – on file with author).
217
Tech Transfer Central, Marketing University Innovations: Strategies to Revitalize and Expand a
High-Touch,
Low-Tech
Approach
that
Gets
Results
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When Arthur Bienenstock convened the Stanford meeting in 2006, he insisted
that it be attended by both TTO officials and university research administrators.
This combination was important, because while TTOs may be motivated by the
desire to enter into as many licensing agreements as possible, upper-level university
administrators may have a broader view of the university’s public mission. This
combination of perspectives led to the Nine Points document. However, once the
Nine Points document was signed, the day-to-day business of technology transfer
returned to the TTOs, which exercise significant discretion in the implementation
of university licensing arrangements. As such, a return to the public spirit of the
Nine Points document may be needed to temper the commercial focus of many
TTOs.
3. TTO Policy Advocacy and AUTM
Beyond the negotiation of licensing agreements, TTOs have begun to exercise
influence over broader university policy concerning technology transfer. Much of
this influence comes through the efforts of AUTM, the industry trade association
comprised largely of TTO personnel.218 Though AUTM originally supported the
Nine Points document,219 that support has gradually waned and, by 2013, leadership
of the organization was actively backpedaling on certain commitments made in the
document.220
AUTM’s advocacy efforts have increasingly sought to strengthen patent rights
and to erode mechanisms for granting broad access to patented inventions. In 2021
alone, AUTM issued formal statements (a) supporting regulations that would
prevent the consideration of drug pricing as a ground for the exercise of march-in
rights under the Bayh-Dole Act,221 (b) opposing the World Trade Organization’s
proposed waiver of trade penalties against nations that issue compulsory licenses
relating to Covid-19 vaccines,222 and (c) advocating for the restoration of U.S.
patent protection for products of nature, natural laws and mental activities.223

https://techtransfercentral.com/marketplace/distance-learning/marketin…vitalize-and-expand-ahigh-touch-low-tech-approach-that-gets-results/ (visited Oct. 21, 2021).
218
An excellent history of AUTM’s advocacy role can be found in Christopher S. Hayter & Jacob
H. Rooksby, Policy advocacy and organizational change at the Association of University
Technology Managers (AUTM) in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 131 (Jacob H. Rooksby ed., 2020).
219
See note 148, supra.
220
See note 191, supra, and accompanying text (discussing reduction of AUTM’s opposition to the
transfer of patents to PAEs).
221
Assn. Univ. Tech. Managers, AUTM’s Comments on 37 CFR Parts 401 and 404 (Docket ID
Number: 201207-0327) (Mar. 28, 2021).
222
Assn. Univ. Tech. Managers, Patent Waiver Strikes Damaging Blow to the Future of Innovation
(May 6, 2021).
223
Assn. Univ. Tech. Managers, AUTM’s Comments on USPTO’s Patent Eligibility Jurisprudence
Study (Docket Number: PTO-P-2021-0032) (Oct. 14, 2021).
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AUTM has been joined in these advocacy efforts by other higher education
associations,224 as well as individual universities.225 In 2021, AUTM, together with
various trade associations and universities, formed the Bayh-Dole Coalition, an
advocacy group devoted to “protecting the Bayh-Dole Act and educating
policymakers about the positive impacts of the law”.226 Whatever their technical
merits, positions favoring stronger patent protection and decreased access to
affordable drugs arguably run counter to at least the spirit, and in many cases the
letter, of the Nine Points document.
The most recent trends in AUTM’s advocacy efforts may be explained by shifts
in the organization’s internal governance structure that began around 2014. As
recounted by Professors Christopher Hayter and Jacob Rooksby, prior to 2014
AUTM’s leadership was embodied by a board of directors and a rotating one-year
presidency held by a member (a structure similar to that of many professional
associations).227 But in 2014 AUTM hired a full-time executive director (also
answerable to the Board),228 giving the organization a more consistent and coherent
policy platform and the bandwidth to engage regularly in advocacy activities
perceived to benefit its membership.229
To a significant degree, the positions taken by AUTM in recent years have
sought to strengthen patent protection and limit the broad availability of patented
224

See, e.g., Association of American Universities, Association of Public and Land-grant
Universities, Council on Governmental Relations, American Council on Education, Association of
American Medical Colleges, Joint Association Comments on 37 CFR Parts 401 and 404 (Docket
ID
Number:
201207-0327)
(Apr.
5,
2021),
https://www.cogr.edu/sites/default/files/JointAssocationComments_NIST%20NPRM.pdf
[hereinafter University Coalition Comments] (supporting exclusion of pricing considerations from
the exercise of march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act).
225
See, e.g., comments filed by Yale, CalTech, University of California and WARF supporting the
exclusion of pricing considerations from the exercise of march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act
(collected at https://www.keionline.org/354320.
226
Bayh-Dole Coalition, About, https://bayhdolecoalition.org/about/#members (visited Dec. 19,
2021).
227
Hayter & Rooksby, supra note 218, at 140-41.
228
Id. at 140.
229
The following table shows the number of public policy statements issued by AUTM from 2014
to 2021 as listed on the AUTM website, https://autm.net/about-tech-transfer/advocacy/autm-speaksout/
Year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

Advocacy
Documents
1
2
1
4
5
9
7
11
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technologies. As such, AUTM’s evolution into an influential lobbying and
advocacy organization for university TTO interests has placed it at odds with the
public-oriented sentiments expressed in the Nine Points document.
This being said, AUTM is, at root, a membership organization, the role of which
is to reflect the views and priorities of its members. And these members are, by
and large, university TTO personnel. But do TTOs appropriately represent the
interests of the broader academic community? In many areas – land use, curricular
priorities, equity, diversity and inclusion, campus security, investment divestiture
and the like230 -- University governance involves a broad range of stakeholders
from faculty and students to alumni and local communities. Why, then, is university
policy surrounding intellectual property and technology transfer set largely by
small groups of non-academic business professionals who are often motivated by
financial incentives?
In contrast, the engagement of broader university constituencies in the
formation of technology transfer policy could help to shift those policies back
toward the public interest goals espoused by the Nine Points document. As
demonstrated by the Zerit incident231 and the continuing efforts of UAEM to nudge
universities toward greater public accountability,232 many students care deeply
about their universities’ policies concerning technology transfer and intellectual
property, particularly as they impact global health. Likewise, faculty members who
are not directly involved in technology transfer activities often have strong views
regarding university policy in this regard. Finally, as intuited by Arthur
Bienenstock when planning the Stanford meeting, senior academic and research
leadership can view intellectual property policy within the broader context of
universities’ public missions and should thus have a greater voice in policy
determinations.
Yet the author is not aware of any universities that have implemented formal
institutional mechanisms for fashioning technology transfer policy in a multilateral
manner or which seek input from interested stakeholder groups beyond the TTO.
Constituting such multilateral decisionmaking bodies and empowering them to
guide university policy concerning technology transfer could help to redirect those
policies away from purely commercial considerations and more toward the public
interest goals espoused by the Nine Points document.
In short, if universities expressed dissatisfaction with the policy positions taken
by AUTM, then those positions could be redirected toward a more public
orientation. In the alternative, given that AUTM is, technically, a trade association
for university “technology managers” (i.e., TTO personnel), then more generallyfocused university associations such as the Association of American Universities
(AAU), the Association of Public and Land Grant Universities and the Association
230

[add citations]
See notes x, supra, and accompanying text.
232
See notes x, supra, and accompanying text.
231
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of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) could take a more active role in public
policy debates over these issues, rather than simply following the lead of AUTM.233

4. Why Did They Sign?
If universities have largely failed to adopt the recommendations of the Nine
Points document and to adhere to its basic principles, then why did so many
universities sign it? Is it merely window dressing and reputation burnishing – a
high-minded set of principles that adorns institutional websites without much cost
or inconvenience?
Professor Winickoff offers a more cynical option, writing that “[i]f signatories
to the document intended to enlighten their peers, they also intended to make
themselves more accountable to their publics, perhaps before those very publics
(whether students, industry, local businesses, or the global sick) demanded stronger
forms of control.”234 This statement suggests that universities, smarting from
increasing public criticism, may have sought to appease critics by signing a
document that paid lip service to public-minded ideals, but in reality was intended
to obviate calls for greater oversight of, or stricter control over, university activities.
This tactic is not without precedent, and there is a long history of organizations
voluntarily committing intellectual property to the public good in order to avoid
public scorn, governmental regulation or adverse judicial action.235
Yet the participants in the 2006 Stanford meeting that led to the creation of the
Nine Points document seem genuinely to have sought to improve at least some
aspects of university technology licensing. If the Nine Points document is less than
perfect, and if it has failed to live up to its promise, then that may be more a result
of the manner in which it was conceived. Unlike more focused policy statements
such as the 2009 Statement on humanitarian licensing, the organizers of the 2006
Stanford meeting did not convene in order to develop a consensus position on a
single issue of pressing concern. Rather, as discussed in Part II.A, above, the direct
impetus for the Stanford meeting was consternation over WARF’s hESC licensing
program. But the attendees at Stanford were each asked to bring their top two or
three issues to the meeting, and these reflected a broad range of practical and policy
concerns that had little relation to one another. The resulting document covered a
smörgåsbord of topics ranging from retained rights and limitations on exclusivity
to conflicts of interest and export controls to global health and access to medicines.
At some point, a title for the document was formulated, and it sought to unify these
disparate elements under the banner of the “public interest”. Yet that labeling
233

See, e.g., University Coalition Comments, supra note 224.
Winickoff, supra note 13, at 32.
235
See, e.g., Contreras, Open COVID, supra note 21, at x (discussing potentially self-interested
patent pledges by Fortress and Moderna); Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZONA ST. L.J.
543, 588-90 (2015) (discussing voluntary commitments made to refrain from asserting patents in
order to avert governmental action).
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exercise, while successful in terms of public messaging, did not accurately reflect
what was really a grab bag of principles and contractual terms with little practical
coherence.
Today, perhaps due to its title, most references to the Nine Points document are
directed to Point 9 concerning equitable access to medicines.236 The document’s
more technical provisions pertaining to exclusivity, retained rights, future
inventions, export controls and conflicts of interest have largely been absorbed into
internal TTO practice and seldom appear in the public discourse. Likewise,
discussions of university patent enforcement and transactions with PAEs have
largely evaporated as it has become increasingly clear that universities can earn
gigantic windfalls by enforcing patents in litigation without significant public
backlash.237
Given its origin and structure, it is not surprising that TTO officials did not
substantially revise their contractual templates after their universities signed the
Nine Points document. Today, the document is perceived to represent more a
general spirit of public-minded stewardship over university technology than a
pragmatic library of contractual clauses. And, as such, it may still have value. The
Nine Points document (at least Point 9) has served as a springboard for more
focused and directly actionable initiatives such as the 2009 Statement and the
Covid-19 Licensing Framework. And even if its title is not representative of the
majority of its content, the Nine Points document, for the first time, announced to
the world that leading universities considered their role to be one of public
stewardship – a role that they have imperfectly fulfilled, but one to which they can,
and should, continue to aspire.

E.

Limitations and Future Directions for Study

The study described in this article is necessarily subject to a number of
limitations. First, our sample of 224 university licensing agreements is slightly
greater than one percent of the total estimated 20,000 university licensing
agreements that have been signed during the period studied, resulting in a margin
of error of 7%. A larger sample would produce more robust results.
More importantly, as described in Part II.A, the large majority of Reviewed
Agreements were obtained from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
EDGAR database. University licensing agreements filed with the SEC have two
significant constraints: the licensee must be a publicly traded company in the
United States (or a company applying to have its stock listed on a U.S. stock
exchange), and the agreement must be material to the company’s business.238 As a
result, such agreements necessarily exclude licenses granted to non-U.S. entities,
236
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238
See notes x, supra, and accompanying discussion.
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non-profit organizations, public companies for which the agreement is not material
(e.g., large pharmaceutical firms), small companies that never went public (i.e.,
many university spinouts), and entities that seek to remain privately held (e.g., some
PAEs). The exclusion of these agreement categories could bias our results in
various ways. For example, licenses to nonprofit organizations may have been more
likely to include the Recommended Clauses of Point 9, and the exclusion of licenses
to PAEs could skew results relating to Point 8. Moreover, the fact that our sample
includes only “material” agreements may skew our results more heavily toward
agreements that are the most heavily negotiated by licensees, resulting in terms that
are more favorable to the licensees and less favorable to the university licensors.
Future studies may benefit from the review of non-public agreements, to the extent
that such agreements can be obtained from universities or their licensees.
Additionally, like most studies of contractual terms, this study was limited to
the review of executed agreements. This study did not have access to initial or
interim drafts of agreements or their negotiating history. Thus, our results do not
account for contractual terms that might have been proposed by a university, but
which were rejected by the licensee and thus omitted from the final agreement, or
agreements that were negotiated but never executed. Further investigation of the
negotiation history of university patent licensing agreements could offer additional
insights into the practices and goals of universities in this area.
The scope of this study was limited to the measurable effect of the Nine Points
document on the text of university licensing agreements. There are several other
measures of university licensing that can be assessed, including the degree of
dissemination of university technology in the field, the creation of products based
on university technology, the returns earned by universities from their licensing
activities, and the amount and type of intellectual property litigation in which
universities engage. In addition, useful information could be gained from an
investigation of the effects of university licensing programs that emerged after the
Nine Points document, including the Covid-19 Technology Access Framework and
the AUTM Covid-19 Licensing Guidelines and the recently announced University
Technology Licensing Program (UTLP).
CONCLUSIONS
The Nine Points document was announced in 2007 with much fanfare. It
attracted more than a hundred university signatories in the United States and abroad
and, as such, has been among the most influential and highly cited documents in
the field of academic technology transfer. Yet this study suggests that the Nine
Points document prompted few measurable changes in university licensing
practices. Universities largely continued to include in their licensing agreements
the contractual clauses that they had previously included, and did not, to any
meaningful degree, add new clauses recommended by the Nine Points document.
To the extent they did, such clauses largely protected university interests rather than
61
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the public interest. Nor did many universities heed the recommendations made by
the Nine Points document regarding their own behavior, whether relating to patent
enforcement, interaction with PAEs or attention to export regulations. In fact, since
the release of the Nine Points document, universities, led by the trade association
AUTM, have increasingly advocated for broader patent protection and limitations
on the government’s ability to require low-cost access to medical technologies. This
trend appears to run counter to the spirit of the Nine Points document.
While various extra-contractual mechanisms, ranging from the selection of
licensees to decisions regarding where to seek patent protection, exist for
universities to shape their technology licensing practices, these actions are difficult
to assess empirically. Thus, unless they are visibly promoted by universities, such
efforts may go unnoticed in the broader community.
The Nine Points document, for the first time, announced to the world that
research universities collectively considered their role to be one of stewardship of
publicly funded technology. The lackluster adoption of the recommendations made
by the Nine Points document suggests that, by and large, universities have
prioritized commercial interests over the public-oriented goals of the document. As
such, a reorientation of university technology transfer policy may be in order – a
shift that may be facilitated through greater engagement of academic faculty, senior
administrators, students, alumni and other institutional stakeholders in setting
policy for university technology transfer.
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APPENDIX
Reviewed Agreements
Licensor

Licensee

Date

University of Utah
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
University of Florida
Medical College of Ohio
University of Texas
University of Utah
California Institute of Technology
University of Pennsylvania
UAB Research Foundation
University of Pennsylvania
University of California
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
University of Colorado
UAB Research Foundation
Louisiana State University
University of California
University of Colorado
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
Trinity College Dublin
University of California
University of Arizona
University of Southern California
University of Illinois
Children's Medical Center Corporation
Duke University
University of Illinois
Johns Hopkins University
Columbia University
University of California
Stanford University
University of California
California Institute of Technology
University of Florida
University of California
University of British Columbia
University of Washington
Johns Hopkins University

Helix Technologies Incorporated
Metabolix, Inc.
Targeted Genetics Corporation
Targeted Genetics Corporation
Intron Therapeutics, Inc.
Myriad Genetics, Inc.
Clinical Micro Sensors, Inc.
Care Management Science Corporation
Biohorizons Dental Implants, LLC
Myriad Genetics, Inc.
Scientific Learning Principles Corp.
Innogene Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
GlobeImmune, Inc.
Novirio Pharmaceuticals, Ltd.
Hybridon, Inc.
Atherogenics Inc.
Myogen, Inc.
TomoTherapy Inc.
Inhibitex, Inc.
Digirad Corporation
ProIX Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Bio-Management, Inc.
Quark Biotech, Inc.
Lakaro Biopharmaceuticals, Inc.
Celsion Corporation
Advanced Life Sciences
Zorax, Inc.
Sentigen Corp.
Allegro Cell Systems, Inc
Xenogen Corporation
Otonomy, Inc.
Insert Therapeutics, Inc.
OraGen, Inc.
Osmotics Corporation
Xenon Genetics Inc.
Lumera Corporation
Second Sight, LLC

8-Oct-91
15-Jul-93
25-Dec-93
14-Mar-94
20-Jul-94
23-Nov-94
8-Feb-95
1-Apr-95
29-Jun-95
13-Mar-96
27-Sep-96
11-Dec-96
18-Sep-97
20-Jun-98
1-Jul-98
17-Jul-98
1-Sep-98
22-Feb-99
8-Apr-99
19-May-99
3-Jun-99
14-Sep-99
15-Sep-99
18-Nov-99
20-Nov-99
2-Dec-99
28-Mar-00
10-Apr-00
27-Apr-00
5-May-00
19-May-00
22-May-00
22-Jun-00
28-Jun-00
1-Aug-00
20-Oct-00
24-Oct-00
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Licensor

Licensee

Date

Brigham Young University
University of California
University of Miami
University College Cardiff and Velindre
University of Maryland
University of California
UT-Battelle
Rutgers
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Baylor College
Harvard College
University of British Columbia
Johns Hopkins University
Stanford University
University of Pittsburgh
Mount Sinai School of Medicine
Oregon Health & Science University
University of Connecticut Health Center
University of Pennsylvania
University of Zurich
Cornell University
UAB Research Foundation
University of Pennsylvania
University of Massachusetts
Columbia University
University of Maryland
Brookhaven Science Associates LLC
Stanford University
Children's Medical Center Corporation
Emory University
Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
Boston University
William Marsh Rice University
Columbia University
University of Iowa
Tel Aviv University
Tel Aviv University
Temple University
The Cleveland Clinic Foundation
University of South Carolina
Duke University

Biopulse, Inc.
SIGA Technologies, Inc.
Utek Corporations
Bioenvision Inc.
Fluorometrix Corporation
Celladon Corporation
Micro Sensor Technologies, Inc.
Oxiquant, Inc.
Cardiomems, Inc.
Opexa Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
NanoSys, Inc.
Oncogenex Technologies Inc.
Paralex
Sunvax, Inc.
Medquest Products, Inc
Amicus Therapeutics, Inc.
Oxiquant, Inc.
Deliatroph Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Polymedix, Inc.
Viventia Biotech, Inc.
Acorda Therapeutics, Inc.
Fluidigm Corporation
Acuity Pharmaceuticals, Inc
CytRx Corporation
Viventia Biotech, Inc.
Amicus Therapeutics, Inc.
Circle Group Holdings Inc.
XTL Biopharmaceuticals Ltd.
Tengion, Inc.
Medical Safety Technologies, Inc.
Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Coley Pharmaceutical Group, Inc.
Natcore Technology, Inc.
Sentigen Biosciences Inc.
Neurogenetics, Inc.
Golden Hand Resources, Inc.
Golden Hand Resources, Inc.
Save the World Air, Inc.
Cleveland BioLabs, Inc.
BioStratum Incorporated
Cellective Therapeutics, Inc.

1-Dec-00
6-Dec-00
1-Jan-01
9-Jan-01
31-Jan-01
10-Feb-01
26-Mar-01
13-Apr-01
1-Aug-01
5-Sep-01
4-Oct-01
1-Nov-01
30-Nov-01
1-Feb-02
13-Feb-02
15-Apr-02
26-Sep-02
15-Nov-02
3-Jan-03
9-Jan-03
3-Feb-03
7-Mar-03
31-Mar-03
15-Apr-03
23-Jun-03
26-Jun-03
22-Jul-03
12-Sep-03
10-Oct-03
30-Dec-03
30-Dec-03
23-Jan-04
31-Mar-04
27-May-04
15-Jun-04
Jul-04
Jul-04
1-Jul-04
1-Jul-04
27-Aug-04
21-Sep-04
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Licensor

Licensee

Date

Rutgers
University of Florida
University of Miami
Columbia University
West Virginia University Research Corp.
University of California
California Institute of Technology
Northwestern University
University of California
University of California
University of Michigan
University of Utah
University of Arkansas
University of Michigan
Harvard College
Duke University
Rockefeller University
California Institute of Technology
University of Pennsylvania
Creighton University
Iowa State University Research Fndn.
Dartmouth College
Penn State
North Carolina A&T State
Harvard College
University of Illinois
University of Texas
University of Alberta
Princeton University
Duke University
University of Washington
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
CBR Institute for Biomedical Research
University of Massachusetts
University of Massachusetts
University of Minnesota
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
Temple University
Washington University in St. Louis
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
University of Washington

Xstream Systems, Inc.
ViewRay, Inc.
Somaxon Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Omnimmune Corp.
IAS Communications Inc.
General Fiber, Inc.
Methanotech, Inc.
Nanosphere, Inc.
Urigen Holdings, Inc.
Urigen Holdings Inc.
Glyconix Incorporated
Glycosan Biosystem, Inc.
IMARX Therapeutics, Inc.
Vical Incorporated
Raindance Technologies, Inc.
Precision Biosciences Inc.
Rosetta Genomics Ltd.
DMFCC
Aegerion Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
SafeStitch LLC
Polyphenol Technologies Corporation
Mascoma Corporation
Spheric Technologies, Inc.
Materials Monitoring Technologies, Inc.
Tetraphase Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Acuity Pharmaceuticals, Inc
Introgen Therapeutics, Inc.
Arcadia Biosciences, Inc.
TetraLogic Pharmaceuticals Corp.
Phase Bioscience Inc.
Achaogen
Tempo Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Advanced Genetic Technologies, Inc.
RXi Pharmaceuticals Corp.
Rxi Pharmaceuticals Corporation
Expression Diagnostics
Colby Pharmaceuticals Company
Save the World Air, Inc.
Modigene, Inc.
Tecogen Inc.
Osmetech

13-Dec-04
15-Dec-04
31-Jan-05
1-Feb-05
17-Mar-05
11-Jul-05
12-Jul-05
1-Jan-06
18-Jan-06
18-Jan-06
20-Jan-06
7-Feb-06
10-Feb-06
14-Feb-06
23-Feb-06
17-Apr-06
4-May-06
9-May-06
19-May-06
26-May-06
12-Jun-06
10-Jul-06
20-Jul-06
2-Aug-06
3-Aug-06
3-Aug-06
30-Sep-06
2-Oct-06
6-Oct-06
18-Oct-06
1-Dec-06
21-Dec-06
1-Jan-07
10-Jan-07
10-Jan-07
24-Jan-07
26-Jan-07
2-Feb-07
2-Feb-07
5-Feb-07
28-Feb-07
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Licensor

Licensee

Date

Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
NINE POINTS DOCUMENT SIGNED
Tufts University
University of Massachusetts
University of Florida
Research Foundation of SUNY
Johns Hopkins University
Stanford University
University of Southern California
University of Pittsburgh
University College London Hospital
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
University of Pennsylvania
University of Texas
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Viginia Commonwealth University
University of Chicago
Dartmouth College
Research Foundation of SUNY
University of California
Univ. North Texas Health Science Center
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
California Institute of Technology
Johns Hopkins University
University of Missouri
Emory University
Johns Hopkins University
University of Colorado
Yale University
University of Washington
Dartmouth College
Emory University
University of Kentucky
University of Chicago
University of Michigan
University of Arizona
Cornell University
Clemson University (Research Foundation)
University of Michigan
Temple University

RXi Pharmaceuticals Corp.

15-Mar-07
Mar-07
18-Jun-07
13-Aug-07
15-Aug-07
31-Aug-07
2-Oct-07
3-Oct-07
22-Oct-07
1-Nov-07
5-Nov-07
21-Nov-07
7-Jan-08
28-Mar-08
21-Apr-08
28-Apr-08
21-May-08
9-Jun-08
30-Jun-08*
30-Jun-08*
9-Jul-08
18-Aug-08
5-Dec-08
1-Jan-09
17-Feb-09
24-Mar-09
16-Jul-09
11-Oct-09
22-Nov-09
3-Dec-09
27-Jan-10
30-Apr-10
8-Jun-10
22-Jun-10
30-Nov-10
31-Jan-11
2-Mar-11
30-Mar-11
2-May-11
22-Jul-11
1-Aug-11

Digital Genomics, Inc.
Anterios, Inc.
MAKO Surgical Corp.
Tempo Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Signpath Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Fundamental Applied Biology, Inc.
Tocagen Inc.
Precision Therapeutics, Inc.
Coronado Biosciences, Inc.
Enable IPC
Epizyme, Inc.
Apellis AG
Miragen Therapeutics, Inc.
Parasol Therapeutics, Inc.
Synthetic Blood International, Inc.
Raindance Technologies, Inc.
Phytomedical Technologies, Inc
Artelo Biosciences, Inc.
Lantis Laser Inc.
Signpath Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
VistaGen Therapeutics, Inc.
Immune Design Corp.
BIND Biosciences, Inc.
Organovo, Inc.
Alimera Sciences, Inc.
Hanes Newco, Inc.
Viral Genetics, Inc.
Rib-X Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Genocea Biosciences, Inc.
Celdara Medical, LLC
Inhibikase Therapeutics, Inc.
Biospherics, Incorporated
BlackBox Semiconductor, Inc.
Medgenics, Inc.
Wildcap Energy, Inc.
Biopancreate, Inc.
Organovo, Inc.
Heal Biologics, Inc.
Save the World Air, Inc.
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Licensor

Licensee

Date

University of Pittsburgh
University of Utah
University of Zurich
University Health Network
Notre Dame
University of British Columbia
Cornell University
University of Texas
Columbia University
Texas A&M University
Stanford University
University of Texas
University of Texas
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
Emory University
University of Arkansas
University of Arkansas
Pennsylvania State Univ.
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Yale University
University of Zurich
University of Colorado
University of California
Brandeis University
Stanford University
Ohio State University
University of Iowa
University of Maryland
University of Texas
University of Basel
University of Massachusetts
University of Colorado
University of California
Ohio State University
University of Kansas
Old Dominion University
Duke University
University of Minnesota
University of Minnesota
University of Texas

Exagen Diagnostics, Inc.
Salaries Pharmaceuticals, LLC
Hookipa Biotech GmbH
VistaGen Therapeutics, Inc.
Kraig Biocraft Laboratories, Inc.
Advanced Inhalation Therapies
Stealth Peptides International Inc.
Peloton Therapeutics, Inc.
Trovagene, Inc.
Oragenics, Inc.
Ruga Corporation
arGEN-X BV
Intertech Bio Corporation
Actinium Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Cellular Dynamics International, Inc.
Clearside Biomedical, Inc.
Cyto Wave Technologies, Inc.
Cyto Wave Technologies, Inc.
TNI BioTech, Inc.
Immune Design Corporation
BIND Biosciences, Inc.
Mirna Therapeutics, Inc.
Syndax Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Caribou Biosciences, Inc.
BRI-Alzan Inc.
Fate Therapeutics, Inc.
MicroLin Bio, Inc.
AAVenue Therapeutics, LLC
Tokai Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
AEMase Inc.
Hookipa Biotech AG
Voyager Therapeutics, Inc.
Ocugen, Inc.
Breathing Technologies, Inc.
Cellectis
Reata Pharmaceuticals, Inc
Electroblate, Inc.
Editas Medicine, Inc.
Regenxbio, Inc.
Cellectis Plant Sciences
Lung Therapeutics, Inc.

2-Aug-11
3-Aug-11
6-Oct-11
24-Oct-11
28-Oct-11
1-Nov-11
3-Nov-11
21-Nov-11
12-Dec-11
20-Dec-11
25-Jan-12
15-Feb-12
2-Apr-12
1-Jun-12
6-Jun-12
4-Jul-12
15-Dec-12
15-Dec-12
1-Jan-13*
16-Jan-13
31-Jan-13
10-Mar-13
28-Mar-13
16-Apr-13
1-May-13
2-May-13
6-Sep-13
14-Oct-13
28-Oct-13
24-Dec-13
1-Jan-14
30-Jan-14
3-Mar-14
19-May-14
1-Aug-14
26-Sep-14
1-Oct-14
10-Oct-14
10-Nov-14
15-Dec-14
8-Jul-15
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Licensor

Licensee

Date

University of Florida
Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
Stanford University
University of Missouri
University of Washington
University of Texas
McGill University
University of Illinois
University of Chicago
University of Michigan
Yale University
University of Southampton
Rutgers
University of Minnesota
University of California
University of California
University Health Network
University of Illinois
Johns Hopkins University
University of Chicago
University of Pittsburgh
University of Texas
Rockefeller University
Northwestern University

Audentes Therapeutics, Inc.
Asothera Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Epinomics
Solid GT, LLC
Solid GT, LLC
Codiak Biosciences, Inc.
Iaso Biomed Inc.
Ocugen, Inc.
Evelo Biosciences
Solid GT, LLC
Protea Biosciences Group, Inc.
Asothera Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Biohaven Pharmaceuticals Holding Co.
Oxis Biotech, Inc.
Creative Medical Technologies, Inc.
TheRas, Inc.
AvroBio, Inc.
G1 Therapeutics, Inc
Unity Biotechnology, Inc.
Aridis Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Immune Ventures, LLC
LogicBio Therapeutics, Inc.
Vir Biotechnology, Inc.
Oncorus, Inc

28-Jul-15
31-Jul-15
15-Oct-15
15-Oct-15
16-Oct-15
10-Nov-15
6-Jan-16
3-Feb-16
10-Mar-16
10-Mar-16
12-Apr-16
18-Apr-16
15-Jun-16
18-Jul-16
25-Aug-16
28-Sep-16
4-Nov-16
23-Nov-16
28-Nov-16
13-Jun-17
26-Jun-17
7-May-18
31-Jul-18
11-Dec-18

* Date rationalized
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